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Abstract 
While there is extensive literature on the determinants of migration and its microeconomic 
effects, the New  Zealand theoretical or empirical literature specifically examining the 
effects of migration on economic growth is not as comprehensive. In New Zealand there 
has been an implicit underlying assumption that immigration is good for economic growth, 
as evidenced by the attempted use of immigration to resolve particular labour market 
problems.  This paper uses the growth accounting policy framework to discuss the 
mechanisms through which immigration can impact economic growth. It reviews the 
contemporary literature with a view to identifying how immigration policy may be adjusted 
to improve the potential returns to growth from immigration in New Zealand. 
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Migration and Economic Growth 
1 Introduction 
New  Zealand entered the 21
st century with around 20 percent of the country’s total 
population born overseas. Such a significant migrant population
1
 can have a range of 
impacts on a country, from influencing its national identity to changing the way that it 
interacts with the outside world. While the impact of migration on New Zealand society is 
clearly wide-ranging, a key question for Treasury is how immigration contributes to 
economic growth. This paper attempts to explain the main mechanisms through which 
immigration impacts on economic growth and investigates the available evidence to try 
and assess whether the economic impacts are positive or negative for New Zealand. 
The New  Zealand approach to immigration policy in recent times has assumed that 
immigration is good for economic growth.  This is evidenced by the use of immigration to 
resolve particular labour market problems.  But does the evidence back up this 
assumption? While there is extensive literature on the determinants of migration and its 
microeconomic effects, there is little New  Zealand specific theoretical or empirical 
literature examining the effects of immigration on economic growth. The literature in this 
area is quite fragmented with no single definitive contribution. Micro-level studies tend to 
be context and migrant-specific. 
Government has a strong influence over immigration policy as it ultimately determines 
who will be admitted to New Zealand and for how long. It is therefore important that the 
government ensures it has an evidence-based immigration policy programme designed to 
select migrants who will bring the greatest net benefits to New Zealand.  
Thinking strategically about immigration issues requires a long-term perspective. Short-
term data gives volatile results and it is difficult to see whether significant trends are 
emerging. Immigration policy, however, is often adjusted in response to current labour 
market conditions or immediate social or political concerns. It is also suggested in this 
paper that there has been a structural shift in immigration patterns over the last ten years 
to a system that focuses on temporary migration. Accordingly, this paper does not review 
the historical literature on economic growth and migration; instead it reviews the 
contemporary literature with a view to identifying how immigration policy could be adjusted 
to improve the returns to economic growth from migration in New Zealand today.  
The original motivation underlying this paper was a desire to understand the extent to 
which immigration is a driver of economic growth. There is irrefutable evidence in 
New  Zealand that migration has enabled our society to develop through exchange of 
ideas and an influx of people, and in this respect New Zealand is not alone. This is a story 
                                                                  
1   In this paper migrants are defined as persons born overseas but usually resident in New Zealand.  
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repeated throughout the world; the United States, Canada and Australia are all examples 
of what are sometimes termed ‘traditional immigration countries’. They have experienced 
massive inward migration as well as strong economic growth over the past century. Can 
the extent to which immigration is a cause of this growth be ascertained? Can a strong 
relationship between immigration and economic growth be found?  
It is clear that international migration has major consequences for both source and host 
countries.  Coppel, Dumond and Visco (2001) identify four main types of economic effect.  
First, migration has an effect on the host country’s labour market.  It can reduce the 
wages and employment levels of natives; on the other hand it can reduce skill shortages.  
Secondly, it can have fiscal consequences, since the amount that immigrants pay in taxes 
may not exactly offset the costs of health and education that they receive.  Thirdly, 
migration can affect the demographic composition of both the host and source countries. 
For example, it has been argued that immigration could be a solution to the problem of 
population ageing in many OECD countries.
2
  Finally, migration may contribute directly to 
economic growth in both the host and source countries.  Remittances by emigrants can be 
a major source of capital that drives development in the source country.  On the other 
hand, the emigration of skilled workers can reduce productivity and economic growth. 
This paper does not attempt to develop a new theory of migration and economic growth. 
Instead it surveys some of the highly aggregative existing models and then utilises a growth 
accounting framework to think about the mechanisms through which migration influences 
GDP per capita growth. To do this the paper primarily focuses on how migrants affect labour 
productivity and labour utilisation, and the results that this may have. The paper then moves 
to the implications for policy makers and suggests possible areas for adjustment. 
In order to limit the scope of this task this paper only cursorily discusses the non-
economic impacts of migration. The question at hand is the impact of migration on GDP 
per capita growth, not on society at large. Any conclusions reached here would then have 
to be considered in light of whether migration is desirable or undesirable for other 
reasons, such as social cohesion.  
New Zealand’s migration context is described in Section 2, including a brief description of 
the existing migration framework and recent trends. Readers who are already familiar with 
this framework may wish to omit reading this section.  There are a number of highly 
aggregative models for assessing the impact of migration as described in Section 3.  A 
growth accounting framework is then used to identify the main pathways through which 
migration affects economic growth per capita.  Section 4 discusses the impact of migration 
on labour force participation and employment.  The productivity effects of migration are 
discussed in Section 5.  Section 6 is used to briefly explore the wider implications of 
migration, including the fiscal impact. The policy implications are then discussed in 
Section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
                                                                  
2   This issue is not covered in detail in this paper. In short, evidence indicates that migration is not an easy solution for the population 
ageing problem. McCarthy and Collins (2001) note that to rectify the current fiscal imbalance in OECD countries caused by an ageing 
population a “large” increase in migration would not be enough, but it would have to in fact be an “enormous” increase.  For example, to 
maintain the 1995 worker-to-retiree ratio in 2050 the United Kingdom would need to accept around 60 million immigrants between 1995 
and 2050, or a 16-fold increase on the 1990-1998 flows (McCarthy and Collins 2001, p29).  Fundamentally, the reason such large 
migration flows would be required is that migrants eventually move through the age pyramid and require support themselves. Guest 
and McDonald (2002), in a study of Australia, conclude that any immigration flows to address the problem of an ageing population in 
Australia would need to be massive and in any case are not necessary. Their argument is essentially that with an ageing population 
and low fertility, the need for saving and investment to maintain the capital-labour ratio is reduced. Using current New Zealand 
population projections a similar result could be established for New Zealand. A net migration inflow of 5000 migrants per year for the 
next 50 years increases population projections for the year 2050 by around 360,000, but reduces total dependency projections by less 
than two percentage points (Population and Sustainable Development Report 2003).  
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2  New Zealand’s migration context 
Migration is a dynamic process. There are cyclical elements to inflows and outflows due to 
the effect of economic cycles.  Any policy response needs to operate within the current 
context. Therefore this paper focuses on the contemporary migration story. There is 
evidence that in the last five years or so there has been a fundamental shift in the type of 
migration received by New Zealand. The evidence shows that over the last five years 
temporary flows have become increasingly important in global migration, both in terms of 
quantum of inflows as well as in providing a supply of semi-integrated migrants ready to 
move into residence categories. 
This section outlines the current structure for immigration in New  Zealand. A basic 
understanding of the current categories is a useful starting point for evaluating the 
contributions that immigration can make to economic growth and also for understanding 
possible policy levers to influence change.   
2.1 Immigration  categories 
2.1.1 Residence  categories 
New Zealand’s immigration system can be divided into two main entry streams: residence 
and temporary. In 2004/05 there were 48,800 people approved for residence and over 
82,500 individuals were approved with temporary permits. 
The stated objective of New  Zealand's residence immigration policy is to contribute to 
economic growth through enhancing the overall level of human capability in New Zealand, 
encouraging enterprise and innovation, and fostering international links, while maintaining 
a high level of social cohesion. The New Zealand Immigration Service (NZIS) Operations 
Manual states that this objective is achieved through selecting a broad mix of migrants on 
the basis of either their skills and experience or their family links to New  Zealand 
(New Zealand Immigration Service 1999). 
Residence policy is broken down into the Skilled/Business Stream, Family Sponsored 
Stream, and the International/Humanitarian Stream. The Skilled/Business Stream is 
explicitly designed to increase human capability and this stream dominates residence 
policy. The explicit objective of increasing human capability through the use of residence 
policy suggests that residence policy should be aiming to maximise the flow of human 
capital to New Zealand until it reaches the tipping point where there may be negative 
impacts on social cohesion.  This implies a need to ensure that there are observable and 
measurable social cohesion indicators.
3
 
The Skilled Migrant Category (SMC) was announced in July 2003 after a comprehensive 
review of the General Skills component of the Skilled/Business stream of the 
New  Zealand Immigration Programme. The SMC replaced the previous General Skills 
Category (GSC), which operated under a single tier points system. Its stated aim is to 
promote the active recruitment of skilled migrants to New Zealand.  
The Business Stream is also part of the government’s residence programme. The 
objective of Business Immigration Policy is to contribute to economic growth through 
increasing New Zealand's level of human capital, encouraging enterprise and innovation, 
and fostering external links.  
                                                                  
3   This work is currently being undertaken by the Ministry of Social Development.  
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It is important to note that not all immigration categories have an economic objective. 
While economic growth is explicitly stated as an objective of the skilled/business 
categories as well as being addressed through some components of temporary policy, the 
Family Sponsored Stream and the International/Humanitarian Stream do not have 
economic objectives.  
The objective of the Family Sponsored Stream (Family Category and Family Quota) for 
example is to contribute to nation building. While it does not have a specific growth 
objective, this stream is significant as it generally accounts for around 30 percent of all 
residence approvals (New  Zealand Immigration Service 2004). This stream allows 
New Zealand citizens and residents to sponsor family members to live in New Zealand 
(under certain circumstances). Migrants approved under this stream have a different 
profile from the skilled/business migrants. For example they are less educated, often older 
and as a result generally have poorer employment and settlement outcomes than other 
migrant groups.  
The International/Humanitarian stream is mainly comprised of Refugee Quota people, 
asylum seekers, Samoan Quota and the Pacific Access Category (PAC). New Zealand's 
refugee policy is designed to ensure that New Zealand meets its obligations under the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. New Zealand accepts around 750 United Nations mandated refugees 
as part of the refugee quota each year. In addition there are asylum seekers who claim 
asylum after crossing the border. New Zealand is then required to ascertain whether they 
meet the requirements for official refugee status.  The Samoan Quota and PAC recognise 
the importance of the relationship between New  Zealand and the Pacific Islands. The 
International Stream makes up only ten percent of the residence approvals.  
2.1.2 Temporary  categories 
The objectives of New  Zealand's temporary entry policy are to facilitate the entry of 
genuine visitors, students and temporary workers, while managing the associated risks, 
and to contribute to building strong international links, attracting foreign exchange 
earnings and addressing skills shortages (New Zealand Immigration Service 1999).  
In considering economic impacts, the most significant categories of temporary entry policy 
are the student visa category and the work permit category.
4
 This is partly because the 
objectives of these categories are partially economic objectives and partly because of the 
large numbers of visas that are issued under these categories.  
The purpose of New Zealand's student policy is to facilitate the entry of foreign students in 
order to foster the development of international linkages and mutual goodwill and 
understanding through reciprocal exchange schemes, and promote increased foreign 
exchange earnings from educational services, and enhance the quality of New Zealand's 
educational services. 
The objective of work visa and permit policy is to contribute to developing New Zealand's 
human capability base.  Work policy seeks to achieve this by facilitating the access of 
New Zealand employers and New Zealand industry to global skills and knowledge, while 
complementing the Government's education, training, employment and economic 
development policies. 
                                                                  
4   Visitor permits are important for tourist revenue but their impact is outside the scope of this paper.  
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The impacts of migration for the labour market are significantly affected by trends in work 
permits. This is discussed further under the sections on labour utilisation and labour 
productivity. 
2.2 21
st Century trends 
2.2.1  Demand for residence and temporary permits 
Demand for residence was strong in New Zealand over the 2000-2005 period leading to a 
high level of approvals. Changes to the skilled/business stream in 2003 seem to have led 
to an increase in residence approvals under this category, despite a dip in 2003/04. The 
higher approval numbers in 2004/05 were a result of a combination of factors including 
prioritisation of SMC applications, low SMC decline rates, successful marketing initiatives 
in key markets and a slightly higher average family size. 
Under the current system approximately 60 percent of places in the Immigration 
Programme (NZIP) are allocated to a skilled/business stream, 30 percent to a family 
sponsored stream and 10 percent to an international/humanitarian stream. If the full quota 
is not taken up under either the family sponsored or international/humanitarian stream, the 
places can be reallocated to the skilled stream.  
The final total residence approvals for the 2003/04 Immigration Programme are set out in 
Table 1 below.  
Table 1 – Approval limits and approvals by stream since 2001/02 
 
  2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004  2004/2005 





35,876 27,000     
(+/- 3,000) 
30,443 27,000     
(+ 3,000) 





14,500   
(+/- 10%) 
14,276 13,500     
(+/- 1,500) 
14,809 13,500     
(+ 1,500) 





3,500   
(+/- 10%) 
2,704 4,500     
(+/- 500) 
3,286 4,500     
(+ 500) 
4,959 4,500     
(+ 500) 
5,040 
Total  53,000 
max 
52,856 45,000     
(+/-5,000) 
48,538 45,000     
(+ 5,000) 
39,017 45,000     
(+ 5,000) 
48, 815 
Source: New Zealand Immigration Service (2005)  
In 2002 the Immigration Programme was set at 45,000 (+/- 5,000 places).  This level was 
identified as an appropriate numerical constraint on residence migration for the next three 
years.  In 2002/03, however, the programme was raised to 50,000 to meet excessive 
demand. Concern has been voiced in the media regarding the relative decline in 
skilled/business approvals in 2003/04 relative to previous years. This decline is likely to be 
a result of the transition to the new SMC and to the higher quality standard required of 
migrants under the SMC. The results from 2004/05 show that this concern is unfounded, 
with a significant increase in approvals in the skilled/business stream from 20,596 
approvals in 2003/04 to nearly 30,000 in 2004/05.   
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The figure below shows trends since 1995/96 in the residence categories.  
Figure 1 - People approved for residence compared with the NZIP from 1995/96 to 
2004/05 
 
Demand in temporary categories has also been high. Work permit numbers have 
increased substantially since 1997/98 from 26,336 to 66,827 in 2002/2003.  The majority 
of this increase can be attributed to more skill shortage permits being issued and an 
increase in working holiday scheme visas.  In the six months to 31 December 2003 over 
35,000 individuals were granted work permits. 38 percent of these were granted for the 
purpose of filling a skill shortage in New  Zealand (New  Zealand Immigration Service 
2004).  The majority of those applying for work visas are high skilled people.  
The impacts of migration for the labour market are significantly affected by trends in work 
permits. This is discussed further under the sections on labour utilisation and labour 
productivity. 
2.2.2  Net migration trends 
New Zealand’s net migration figures can be quite volatile. 2002 was a key turning point as 
there was a rapid turnaround from negative to positive net migration. New Zealand has 
remained a net recipient of migrants since that period.   
Very high movements of people (both in and out) typify New  Zealand’s net migration 
statistics. Permanent and Long-term (PLT) net migration records the balance of migrant 
inflows and outflows for 12 months or more. NZIS data records applications and approvals 
for permanent residence, and student and work visas.  
In the 12 months to the end of May 2002 there was a permanent and long-term net 
migration gain of 31,231 people compared to a net loss of 11,114 for the previous 12-
month period. In the 12 months to the end of May 2003 the gain spiked at 42,541 and 
dropped to a net gain of 23,983 to May 2004 (Statistics New Zealand 2003). Since this 
time net migration has continued to fall. These figures clearly indicate why the  
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government’s immigration programme is not linked to any net migration targets.
5
 With the 
existence of largely demand driven categories such as student and work permits and the 
free movement of New Zealanders out of the country, any attempt to reach a net annual 
target would not be feasible. 
Figure 2 – Monthly PLT Arrivals and Departures 
 
Source: Statistics NZ  
An increase in departures and slowdown in the arrival of overseas students led to a 
decline in net migration over 2005. Possible reasons for this were improved economic 
prospects overseas and an improvement in the perception of safety overseas. Up to 
February 2006 there was a slight drop off in departures of both New Zealand and non-
New Zealand citizens. Monthly arrivals remain volatile with an upward trend, despite a 
drop off in January 2006. Arrivals from the UK are dominating the increases. 
Generally, the state of the New Zealand economy has a large impact on net migration 
changes. A large proportion of PLT departures (people who intend to leave for at least 
one year) tend to stay away for longer when NZ is in a recession and there are people 
who category jump (ie people who don’t intend to stay away for a year switch categories) 
in response to the economic conditions of the day. 
Net migration is strongly influenced by emigration as it plays an important role in 
exacerbating certain immigration effects.  The number of New Zealanders permanently 
leaving New Zealand has been steadily increasing since the early 1990s, but high levels 
of immigration have masked any effects of this emigration. In the year to June 2001 there 
was a net loss of 41,000 New Zealand citizens.  However, with a net gain of 31,000 non-
New  Zealanders, the overall net migration loss was only 10,000 people (New  Zealand 
Ministry of Economic Development 2003). From 2001-2004 the return migration of 
New Zealanders has been at its highest recorded levels.  Emigration is discussed in more 
detail in Section 5. 
                                                                  
5   In 1998 the government decided that New Zealand should aim for a net gain from permanent and long-term migration of 10,000 people a 
year over the medium term. In July 2001 Cabinet agreed that net migration should be disassociated from the Immigration Programme.  
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2.2.3 Composition  Trends 
The inflow of migrants affects the composition of the New Zealand population, for example 
new and recent migrants have a smaller proportion of people in the younger and older age 
groups (NZIER 2003). Migrants also affect the ethnic composition of New Zealand. Asia 
currently dominates as the region of origin for migrants.  In 2001 one in five of 
New Zealand’s working-age population was born overseas.  This proportion rose to one in 
three in Auckland.  The 2001 census found that there were nearly 230 countries 
represented in the birthplaces of people usually resident in New Zealand.   
As noted above, it is important to look at the levels of temporary migration, which have 
become increasingly significant as a proportion of total arrivals in New Zealand in the past 
few years. Strong work permit numbers are a key source for the permanent residence 
skilled category, particularly under the new SMC.  Work permit numbers are also likely to 
be more sensitive to current conditions relative to competitor countries than other 
categories as temporary workers are usually more flexible and may substitute other 
similar countries with better conditions. 
3  Theories of migration and economic growth 
This section outlines the key theoretical models of economic growth that incorporate 
migration. The macroeconomic effects of immigration are complex and it is unclear 
whether per capita incomes will increase as a result of immigration, although in the 
literature there is a general agreement that there is probably a small positive effect on 
GDP per capita from immigration.  Effectively our interest lies in explaining in what 
circumstances an additional migrant could increase the level of income per head in a 
country.  The key components of such an analysis are obvious; the contribution and costs 
of the migrant’s own income as well as effects on wider income generation and wider 
benefits (social and cultural), as well as fiscal costs and benefits must be considered.  
The literature identifies a variety of theoretical models that can be used to model the 
growth effects of migration. In the 1950s, in particular, there was a large body of literature 
produced on economic growth and migration. This paper does not propose to review all of 
this literature, nor all of the models available. It surveys some of the main theoretical 
approaches to migration and discusses some of the main effects on the host and source 
country that the models predict.  
One strand of the literature is firmly rooted in the economics of international trade, while 
another approach employs methods of labour economics.  Some economic growth 
models have explicitly incorporated migration as an explanatory variable.  Another 
approach involves the use of a growth accounting framework.  A further approach, used 
for example by Chapple and Yeabsley, uses neoclassical economic theory with some 
short-run Keynesian interactions to identify the channels through which migration affects 
national welfare (Chapple and Yeabsley 1996).  
These models provide different ways of thinking about the impact that immigration may 
have but, as is often the case, none of these models provides a complete explanation of 
the effect of migration on economic growth. This section provides a run-through of the 
main theoretical approaches and then a fuller description of the growth accounting 
framework which will be used as an accessible way of explaining the main effects of 
migration on growth in this paper.  
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3.1  Highly aggregative theoretical models 
This section concentrates on some highly aggregative models of trade and labour market 
theory. These theories are the principal economic frameworks used to assess the effects 
of immigration. The former analyses the effect of the free movement of labour on the 
welfare of different countries, mostly using general equilibrium analysis.  The latter 
focuses on the role of the labour market and the effect of migration on the price of labour, 
typically using partial equilibrium analysis.  Most of the literature takes the latter approach, 
focusing on labour market effects of migration.  However, trade theory models are used 
on the basis that there is no good reason to treat labour mobility differently from the 
mobility of any other factor of production and because the general equilibrium framework 
can overcome some of the problems posed by questions such as the impact of 
immigration on wages that occur in the partial equilibrium framework.  
One aspect of the debate in the literature on the effects of migration (for example between 
George Borjas and Jagdish Bhagwati) is whether the most appropriate tools used are 
those of general or partial equilibrium.  Partial equilibrium analyses will necessarily 
provide a narrower viewpoint and a focus on effects in a particular sector rather than the 
broader general equilibrium approach. 
A second aspect is whether the viewpoint taken is that of native, national or global 
welfare. Often only the national viewpoint is taken, and within that the impact on natives.  
Certainly it is rare to pay attention to measures of world rather than national welfare. 
Public policy analysis typically utilises a national welfare approach. 
Finally, some analyses take a static, rather than a dynamic approach to migration, 
focussing for example on immediate effects such as the impact on native wages, rather 
than on dynamic consequences such as the inter-generational effects or the 
responsiveness of natives to immigration. 
3.1.1 Trade  models 
In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade and migration are substitutes (that is, 
migration decreases with trade liberalisation).  The movement of productive factors raises 
world income and these income gains are shared between natives of both source and 
host counties.  It holds that there are mutual gains from migration similar to the 
conventional gains from trade.   
The model predicts that labour migrates from regions where its marginal product is low to 
regions where its marginal product is high, and that it will cross international borders to do 
so.  In the absence of restrictions, labour migration should tend to bring about wage 
convergence between the host and source countries.  The source country will experience 
a rise in wages and a fall in returns to capital, a rise in per capita income and a fall in 
national output (assuming no simultaneous emigration of capital).  The host country will 
see a fall in wages as a result of the influx of workers and a rise in returns to capital.  Per 
capita income will fall although national income rises.  However, if wage earners also see 
some earnings from owning capital (such as pensions, shares or housing), then it is 
possible that per capita incomes of the pre-immigration population rise with the increasing 
return to capital.  The per capita income of the immigrants is also higher than it would 
have been in the source country.  As a consequence, individuals could be better off even 
though the host country is worse off.  When there is simultaneous emigration of capital (in 
the form of financial or human capital) the predicted effects are less clear without precise 
information about the nature, value and ownership of the capital.  
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If there are only two factors of production (capital and labour) the model’s results hold.  
But if there are more than two factors, then the results of factor migration being a perfect 
substitute for trade in causing factor price equalisation may no longer hold.  When 
economies of scale in production are possible, then migration and trade may act as 
complements, rather than substitutes.  Since with economies of scale it is always cheaper 
to produce in one location rather than two, production expands until either demand or 
economies of scale in one country are exhausted.  Production in one country will be 
reduced as production in the other expands.  Factors will shift to the location of expanding 
production. This would increase the host country’s capacity to export, as well as 
increasing its domestic market for imports. 
Davis and Weinstein argue that a conventional approach to assessing the returns from 
immigration only considers discrete inflows of a single factor to the economy.  They use a 
variant of the standard Ricardian trade model to take into account the origins of factor 
price differences that motivate migration.  They argue that in the case of the United States 
its position as a technologically superior economy encourages immigration which wants to 
exploit the technological advantages and that consequently “natives in the country that 
receives immigrants always lose relative to a baseline with free trade” (2002, p4).  Their 
use of a Ricardian model results in the finding that immigration creates a loss for the 
receiving country.  They conclude that the combination of labour immigration and net 
capital inflows impacts negatively on US native incomes, assessing this at losses of 
almost 1 percent of GDP, which equated to approximately $72 billion in 1998 (2002, p36).  
They caution that Pareto gains could be achieved under their model due to the flow of 
factors enhancing world efficiency, that their analysis applies specifically to America and 
that despite the findings of losses to native incomes there is a redistributional effect to 
migrant workers resulting in higher world income overall. They also leave open for debate 
the idea that immigrants are likely to bring with them other important benefits that they do 
not reflect in their analysis. 
A major criticism of the trade theory models is that they cannot hold in an economy where 
there is no free movement of people or where there are more than two factors of 
production. These limitations reduce the relevance of this model as a suitable way of 
explaining growth effects of migration in New Zealand. 
3.1.2  Labour market models 
An alternative approach is to investigate the impact of migration using a model of the 
labour market in the host country.  This approach has been particularly associated with 
the work of Borjas (2000).  The immigration surplus (shown in Figure 3) is used to analyse 
the impact of an increase in migration on the host country.  
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Figure 3 – The immigration surplus 
 
Source: Borjas (1995, p6) 
In the model, wages and employment depend on the relationship between labour supply 
(S) and labour demand (which in the short run is determined by the marginal product of 
labour, MPL).  Before the arrival of immigrants, wages are at W0 and only native workers 
are employed (N). When immigrants enter the country, the supply of labour expands 
(represented by a shift in the supply curve to the right from S0 to S1) and the market wage 
falls to W1 (all other things being equal).  As a result, native workers earn a lower wage. 
Total employment increases to N + 1.  The economy’s total output also expands.  Total 
output is represented by the area under the marginal product curve and to the left of the 
supply curve.  This area is larger following the increase in labour supply.  The expansion 
in output generates an increase in income for the owners of capital in local firms (and, of 
course, income for immigrants).  Under certain conditions the loss in income for native 
workers is more than offset by the increase in income accruing to the owners of capital.  
The result is a net increase in national income.  This increase is referred to in the labour 
economics literature as the “immigration surplus”.  The surplus is represented by the 
triangular area in the diagram.  
In essence, the surplus arises because immigrants increase national income by more than 
the cost of hiring them.  If there are positive externalities from immigration, the gain is 
even greater. Certain conditions are required to produce an immigration surplus.  The 
model assumes that the supplies of capital and of both native and foreign-born labour are 
perfectly inelastic, and that immigrant workers are perfect substitutes for native workers.  
Using the same formula as Borjas, Poot presents a calculation of the immigration surplus 
in New Zealand (Poot, Nana and Philpott 1988). In his calculation the increase in national 
income due to immigration comes out at approximately 0.16 percent of GDP. As 
emphasised by Borjas (1996), Poot highlights the importance of redistributional effects 
which are potentially much more important than the net gain in national income because 
native workers may lose income while owners of firms gain income.   
It is suggested that neither the trade model theory nor labour market theories are 
satisfactory in explaining the relationship between migration and economic growth.  In 
particular, for our purposes, the labour-market models do not focus on growth in GDP per 
MPL 
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capita. This leads us to suggest alternative ways of thinking about how to explain the 
relationship.  Growth models provide a useful way to consider the pathways through which 
migration may lead to economic growth. 
3.1.3 Growth  models 
Drinkwater, Levine, Lotti and Pearlman (2002) survey the theoretical models of long-run 
growth that can be used to assess the impacts of migration.  They identify three broad 
approaches. 
The first emphasises capital accumulation as the engine of growth, where capital is 
broadly defined to include human capital.  Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) use a two-
country overlapping generations model with mobile capital and labour to investigate 
persistent migration flows and lack of cross-country convergence.  They assume that the 
level of technology is an increasing function of the stock of capital.  The two countries are 
assumed to be identical in technology but different in terms of the initial stocks of factors 
of production.  With increasing returns and perfect capital mobility, they find that the 
driving forces behind labour migration are the size and the composition of the workforce. 
A second approach views growth as being driven by the accumulation of human capital 
(Lucas 1988).  Walz (1996) uses an endogenous growth model in which individuals can 
choose to invest in education or work in the unskilled sector to investigate the effects of 
migration on both source and host countries.  The expected benefit to education is greater 
for workers with greater ability. Migration affects the growth rate of the economies by 
altering the composition of the labour force in each country.  The stock of knowledge 
depends on the average human capital in each country which in turn is driven by 
migration decisions. 
A similar approach is taken by Haque and Kim (1995), in which there is a tendency for 
higher skilled workers to emigrate.  The resultant "brain drain" can bring about a reduction 
in the steady state growth rate of the country of emigration proportional to the fraction of 
the population that has emigrated.  Permanent differences in the growth rates and 
incomes of the source and host countries make convergence unlikely.  
A third approach views innovation and technology as drivers of economic growth (Romer 
1990).  Lundborg and Segerstrom (1998, 2000) analyse the effects of immigration on 
growth using a quality ladders growth model.  They develop a theoretical model of 
free  migration between developed countries and  the consequent growth effects, with 
various cross-country structural and policy differences driving migration, and R&D 
determining growth rates in a two-country 'quality-ladders' model. For both  policy 
and structural changes, the authors find that countries which trade with each other grow at 
the same rate,  in line with  Lucas's (1988) observation that growth rates amongst the 
(highly trade-dependent) developed countries are very similar, while growth rates in less 
developed countries vary widely. In this model growth is driven by improvements in 
product quality and firms race to become the sole producer by hiring high-skilled workers.  
In general the authors conclude that free international migration is only growth-stimulating 
where it is  a reaction to labour force differences across countries. When migration is 
driven by policy differences, or wealth differences across countries, growth effects are 
much less certain, since a policy change can alter the equilibrium  (post-
migration) incentives to invest in R&D in both countries. 
Bretschger (2001) uses a two-country, three-sector model (traditional, high tech and R&D) 
to examine the impact of the supply of skilled and unskilled labour on the growth rate of  
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open economies.  He finds that high-skilled migration has a positive effect (but that low-
skilled labour has a negative effect) on growth in the host country.  Furthermore, the 
emigration of high-skilled workers has a negative effect on growth in the source country – 
the “brain drain” effect.   
Levine, Lotti and Pearlman (2002) use a three sector general equilibrium model with 
endogenous growth to re-examine Borjas’s “immigration surplus”. They find that the 
growth effects of the immigration surplus dominate the static effects in Borjas’s model. 
However, the growth effects do not eliminate the fact that some native workers lose from 
immigration. Wilson uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effect that 
large migration inflows in Canada had on domestic savings, investment, and foreign 
capital inflows (Wilson 2003). In 1897 Canada experienced a reversal from net emigration 
to a large net immigration, especially of skilled, wealthy working-age  British and 
Americans. Migration flows were in the order of 15 percent (of 1901 population) from 
1901-1911, and this period also saw large increases in investment (for example,  the 
capital formation rate of 15 percent of GNP pre-1896 increased to a high of 33 percent in 
1913). The model developed shows that the increase in the domestic savings rate over 
this period is solely attributable to the demographic effects of migration (ie the increase in 
working-age population, who brought wealth and were net savers), rather than changes in 
consumption patterns of natives.  Secondly, increased migration required investment in 
equipping migrants for production and developing social infrastructure, not all of which 
could be financed by increased domestic savings (the authors note that most of the capital 
inflows over this period were government debt and foreign investment in infrastructure). 
Thus, net foreign inflows of capital increased over this period, and  the model shows 
that  both three quarters of this increase, and three quarters of  increased investment 
rates, are attributable to migration. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) develop three models of migration and growth, each 
demonstrating that migration can increase growth rates through faster convergence to a 
steady state income per capita level. Firstly, the Solow-Swan growth model is extended, 
by allowing the labour force to increase at a faster rate than implied by natural population 
growth, with the assumption that capital is immobile other than when carried by migrants. 
There is thus a degree of capital mobility, but only to the extent that migrants bring human 
or physical capital with them. Using rough empirical estimates of the various parameters 
of the model, the authors show that migration can increase the speed of convergence by 
about 10 percent. Extending the Ramsey model of household optimisation gives the same 
conclusion. Finally, the Braun model of migration and growth is explained. Following 
Braun (1993), the cost of migration and the migrating individual’s optimising decision are 
considered, and in contrast to the other models,  varying levels of capital mobility are 
allowed. The model concludes that the possibility of migration raises the rate of 
convergence to the steady state, and where there is a smaller tendency for the cost of 
moving to rise with the migration rate, convergence is faster. This would imply that where 
the income elasticity of migration is higher (the migration rate is more responsive to cross 
country income differentials)  convergence will be faster. Some (tentative)  evidence is 
shown for this last proposition, but the authors are unable to show any evidence that 
migration plays a substantial role in increasing the speed of convergence.  
WP 06/02  MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  14  
General equilibrium models 
General equilibrium models can take into account a variety of impacts of immigration 
simultaneously, and can provide a relatively complete analysis of immigration although the 
level of aggregation involved means microeconomic detail is sacrificed (Chapple, Gorbey, 
Yeabsley and Poot 1994). General equilibrium models using Australian and New Zealand 
data provide some quantitative indication of migration effects. A 1993 Australian study 
used the ORANI model to estimate the effect of a 1 percent increase in the rate of growth 
of the labour force due to immigration. With no economies of scale, real GDP increases by 
0.99 percent and real GDP/worker falls by 0.01 percent, and with full economies of scale, 
real GDP increases by 1.15 percent and real GDP/work rises by 0.15 percent.  
Poot et al also undertook a detailed study using a general equilibrium model (Joanna 
model) as part of a study looking at macroeconomic, sectoral and labour market 
consequences of immigration. Using a net inflow of 15,000 people the study finds GDP 
growth increases by 0.6 percent per year, GDP per capita increases by 0.2 percent per 
year and GDP per worker increase by 0.15 percent per year, against a base scenario of 
zero net migration (Poot et al 1988).  Their key finding was that liberalising immigration 
policy was beneficial to the economy, facilitating economic restructuring and accelerating 
economic growth while maintaining constant consumption per head and reducing 
unemployment. As in most models, the results are highly dependent on the initial 
assumptions used particularly around economies of scale. Equally plausible assumptions 
can reverse the conclusion of positive benefits, in both the Australian and New Zealand 
studies (Chapple et al 1994). 
3.2  Growth accounting  
3.2.1  Framework for Growth Accounting 
Output growth can be broken down into different sources, such as labour inputs. This 
approach is known as growth accounting. Previous Treasury work has used a growth 
accounting framework to examine the impact of different policy areas on GDP per capita 
growth
6
 (see “New Zealand economic growth: An analysis of performance and policy”). 
The framework is not a model of economic growth. However, it does provide a useful 
means of organising ideas about how migration affects growth.  
                                                                  
6   See “New Zealand Economic Growth: An analysis of performance and policy”, 2004  
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/release/economicgrowth/nzeg-app-apr04.pdf  
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Figure 4 – Contributors to growth 
 
In this framework, growth in GDP per capita is driven by growth in labour productivity and 
growth in labour utilisation.
7
 Migration, in turn, can affect growth through one (or both) of 
these two channels.  
3.2.2  The effect of migration on labour productivity and 
utilisation 
Migration clearly affects labour utilisation through the labour force participation rate and 
the unemployment rate.  The extent to which migration affects these rates has a direct 
effect upon labour utilisation and thus on output.  Differing groups of migrants, with 
different labour market characteristics, will have varying effects on participation. The 
literature provides solid data on the participation of various groups of migrants and this is 
discussed in section 4.  
Migration is also likely to affect productivity.  In particular, the human capital of migrants is 
expected to affect the productivity of the labour force.  The emigration of highly skilled 
workers (a “brain drain”) could be expected to reduce labour force productivity and vice 
versa (see Glass and Choy 2001).  Other productivity effects are also possible.  Migration 
can affect capital flows, either through migrants bringing with them investment capital or 
through remittances abroad.  Migrants can also affect multifactor productivity, for example 
there can be spill over effects by having migrants share their knowledge and skills within 
the firm which can encourage innovation. 
Our investigation into the relationship between migration and economic growth can be 
assisted by using the elements in the growth accounting framework to attempt to reach 
propositions of causality. 
                                                                  
7   It is recognised that there are limitations to using GDP per capita. An alternative measure is GDP per working age person. One 
reason for using this latter measure is that the total population is influenced by demographic change—an increase in the birth rate 
or number of elderly will reduce GDP per capita, making it harder to isolate the effects of economic variables on growth.  The 
counter argument is that this ignores the economic effects of the dependency ratio on the overall economic well-being and 
prosperity of a nation. GDP has well-known limitations as a measure of well-being.  However, some of the factors that drive GDP 
also have important implications for well-being.  In particular, employment has important effects on both income and well-being as 
it provides social inclusion and protects against poverty. It also has intergenerational effects, and entering employment from 
welfare can break the cycle of disadvantage and poverty for the worker and his or her children (Blank 2000). 
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Growth accounting frameworks do not appear to have been widely used in migration 
analysis.  Blattner and Sheldon (1989) use a growth accounting framework to identify the 
contribution of immigration to economic growth in Switzerland between 1961 and 1982.  
They find that while foreign workers accounted for 0.3 percentage points of the 2.7 
percent average growth rates during this period, immigrants reduced per capita growth 
over this period, due to their lower productivity. 
It can be difficult, from the data available, to isolate the economic impacts that migration 
has on the native population. To ascertain the impact on natives, consideration must be 
given to whether migrants impact negatively or positively on native labour utilisation or 
native labour productivity. Migrants could also have distributional effects which would also 
need to be separated out. There is often a general assumption that highly skilled 
immigrants will have a positive impact but it is possible, if only natives are considered, that 
if immigrants retain all or most of the gains from their skills then their impact could be to 
make the native population worse off, for example by driving down native wages. In the 
analysis it is important to ensure that gains or losses to natives, which can be assessed in 
terms of average incomes, are not confused with gains or losses evaluated in terms of 
GDP per capita which includes both natives and new immigrants. 
This paper does not seek to model the returns to natives, but where possible the varying 
effects on the native population are highlighted.  The discussion will now focus on the 
New  Zealand evidence in relation to the factors identified in the growth accounting 
framework. 
4 Labour  Utilisation 
Migrants can affect labour utilisation through three channels: the participation rate, the 
unemployment rate, and average hours worked.  During the first half of the 1990s 
New Zealand’s economic growth, measured in GDP per capita, came predominantly from 
an increase in labour utilisation caused by a decline in the unemployment rate and an 
increase in labour force participation.
8
  Participation in the workforce includes not only 
those who are in employment, but also those who are actively seeking work.  Those who 
are not participating include students, stay-at-home parents and those who choose not to 
work. Those who are economically inactive, but of working age, may be facing barriers to 
their employment, ultimately leading to unemployment which deprives the labour market 
of additional resource as well as possibly increasing welfare costs to New  Zealand.   
These barriers to employment are effectively a brake on economic growth. 
Migrants may have a positive impact on GDP per capita if they have higher participation 
and lower unemployment rates than natives. Migrants with lower participation rates than 
the native average will have the effect of lowering GDP per capita with a consequential 
negative impact for the native population. This section looks at the comparative rates of 
employment and participation for migrants, and at barriers to employment. 
                                                                  
8   Labour force participation measures the proportion of the population over fifteen years of age who are either working (employed) 
or without paid work and actively seeking work (unemployed).  
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4.1  Rates of participation and employment 
This section looks at the employment rates and workforce participation rates of migrants 
and compares them to the native population.  Secondly, it discusses evidence on the 
difference between skilled and family migrant stream outcomes. 
4.1.1 Employment  rates 
The employment outcomes for migrants with different levels of skills tend to vary although 
there is a tendency to converge with native employment rates for groups with similar skills 
over time.  Winkelmann (1999) shows that employment rates for immigrants appear to 
converge with those of New Zealand-born residents within 5-15 years for most groups.   
The differentials can persist for certain migrant groups.  Poot, Nana and Philpott (1988) show 
that in 1981, whereas recent migrants from the UK, Australia and North America had similar 
employment outcomes to the New  Zealand born, unemployment rates for recent Pacific 
Island migrants were considerably higher than New  Zealand-born workers and other 
immigrant groups.  Both Poot, Nana and Philpott (1988) and Winkelmann (1999) find that 
male immigrants from UK and Australia had higher unemployment at the outset of their 
residency but that they converged to New Zealand-born levels and then fell below native 
rates within three years of residence. These findings suggest that male immigrants from UK 
and Australia face lower barriers to employment than other migrant groups. 
Analysis of the 2001 census compared to 1996 census demonstrated that the 
employment rates of recent working aged migrants had improved from 46 percent in 1996 
to 50.4 percent in 2001 (Boyd 2003). The remainder were either unemployed (8.7 percent) 
or not in the labour force (40.9 percent). The greatest improvements in employment rates 
were for the recent prime working aged migrants which had increased by over 7 percent 
for both males and females. The male migrant employment rate was 72.5 percent and the 
female migrant rate was 52.7 percent. This is still below the levels of native born with 
similar characteristics. 
The employment rate gap between recent prime working aged migrants and the 
New Zealand born had narrowed between census, although the gap was still significant at 
17.8 percent in 2001. From 1996 to 2001 there was also an increase in employment rates 
for the native population which sit at around 80 percent. For example, the 45-49 year-old 
age group had the highest rate of employment at 82.4 percent (Boyd 2003). 
Analysis of the 2001 census data carried out by the Department of Labour showed that 
employment rates were lower for migrants from non-English speaking countries.
9
 Prime 
working age migrants from non-English speaking countries had consistently lower 
employment rates than prime working aged migrants from English speaking countries or 
the New Zealand born (New Zealand Department of Labour 2004).  
The LisNZ pilot survey collected information on the labour force activities of migrants 
(New Zealand Department of Labour 2004).
10
  The employment rate for Wave 2 in the pilot 
group was 62 percent, with 84 percent of skilled/business migrants employed or self 
                                                                  
9   This study used the standard definition of employment rates as a measurement of the percentage of the working aged population 
who are employed, either full or part time over the total working aged population. 
10   In this survey the labour force activity rate is the proportion of migrants who were working or looking for work out of the total 
working age population, excluding unspecified responses. The seeking work rate is the proportion of migrants who were looking for 
work (and who were not currently working) out of all those in the labour force. The term ‘employment rate’ refers to the proportion 
of all migrants who were employed or self-employed, not just those who were in the labour force.  
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employed. This preliminary data suggests that later cohorts of migrants may be 
experiencing improved employment outcomes. The figure of 84 percent is commensurate 
with the 45-49 year old New Zealand employment rate stated above.  
4.1.2 Participation  rates 
Analysis of the 2001 census data showed that young and older recent migrants were less 
likely to be in the labour force than other age groups. Participation rates for recent 
migrants in 2001 were 39 percent. Migrants aged 15-24 were more likely to be studying 
than to be in the labour force, although the proportion of migrants studying had declined in 
comparison to the 1996 census results. Recent, older migrants had labour force 
participation rates which were significantly lower than those of long-term migrants and the 
New Zealand born.  Their participation rates were 28 percent in comparison to 64 percent 
for long-term migrants and 66percent for the New Zealand born.  
Similarly migrants from non-English speaking countries had lower participation rates than 
English speaking migrants or the New Zealand born. Analysis of the 2001 census data 
showed that North East Asian migrants had the highest non-participation rates at 51.5 
percent, compared to South East Asian migrants at 33.6 percent and migrants from the 
Pacific at 30.4 percent. In 2001 the non-participation rate for the New Zealand born was 
16 percent. These results show that a large section of the migrant population is not 
achieving native rates of participation and therefore may be having a negative impact on 
GDP per capita growth. While this would give policy makers cause for concern, 
conclusions cannot be drawn in isolation from other factors.  
New Zealand’s overall participation rates are high relative to the OECD. But the evidence 
outlined above shows that there is potential to increase the participation rates of migrants. 
Assuming no displacement of native workers (discussed below), increasing the number of 
people employed in the economy raises gross domestic product by the equivalent of their 
production.  This has the effect of increasing total output. Unemployment of migrants has 
a high opportunity cost in terms of total output for the New Zealand economy. There are 
two main levers through which New  Zealand can attempt to improve migrants’ 
participation rates. First, the entry requirements need to be set so that those people 
entering New Zealand have the skills and characteristics that are in demand in the labour 
market, thereby increasing their chance of being employed. Secondly, there are barriers 
to employment that exist within the host community which may be able to be partially 
addressed through government policies. These are discussed further under the policy 
implications section. 
4.1.3  Outcome differences by category 
It is generally assumed in the literature that skilled migrants have more significant and 
enduring positive outcomes than less-skilled or family-based migrants. The United States 
has never had immigration flows that are focused on skills whereas this has been the 
focus of immigration flows to New Zealand since the 1970s.  In analysing the economic 
benefits from immigration experienced by the United States, Borjas (1995, p6) suggests 
that the current small economic benefits could be increased considerably if the United 
States were to attract a more skilled immigration flow. 
However, the extent to which greater economic benefits would be experienced from a shift 
towards a more skilled immigration flow might not be as significant as is often assumed.  
There is evidence to suggest that long-run differences in employment outcomes for skilled 
versus family-based migrants are not as significant as might be expected.  
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Cobb-Clark (2000), writing about family based and skilled migrants in Australia, finds that 
employment rates more closely match visa categories than participation rates do.  Six 
months after arrival employment rates for immigrants in all visa categories were 
significantly lower than those who had arrived under the Australian Business 
Skills/Employer Nomination Scheme programs.  Skill-based migrants seemed to have an 
initial head start in obtaining employment which dissipates over time, but does not 
eliminate the relative gaps in employment outcomes between different categories even 18 
months after arrival.  She concludes that while visa category seems to be quite important 
in the short-run (initial 18 months) for employment outcomes, the evidence in Australia 
indicates that this is unlikely to persist over the long run.  
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) examine changes in occupation status after entry for US 
male immigrants selected under two different groups in the United States; family based 
migrants (marriage to a US citizen) and employment-based migrants (having an 
occupation or skill deemed to be in scarce supply in the United States).
11
  As expected, 
they find that initially the employment-based migrants had significantly higher skills and 
earnings levels than the family-based migrants, even when age, employment experience 
and country of origin are controlled for.  Their work indicated that employment-based 
migrants suffered substantial downward mobility in terms of change in post-immigration 
occupational status, and the family-based migrants experienced substantial upward 
occupational mobility particularly in the first five years after immigration (Jasso and 
Rosenzweig (1995, p108). They suggest that for the employment-based immigrants this is 
partly because they have limited opportunity for upward mobility due to their high skills 
and so it is not surprising that they experience a ‘regression to the mean’. Similarly, the 
family-based migrants are usually in lower-paying occupations initially so their upward 
mobility reflects a natural movement towards the mean. 
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995, p86) suggest that the difference in overall productivity 
between these groups is usually overstated and may be “small or nonexistent”.  The two main 
reasons are first that family-based migrants have immediate access into family networks in 
the United States and second that family members may be adept at screening for long-term 
productivity as opposed to employers who may have a short-term focus.  Their results 
indicate that in the long-run (ten years after immigration) the differential in average 
occupational earnings between the employment-based and family-based migrants was 60 
percent of what it was when the groups became immigrants and this was a result of the 
different directions of their occupational mobility after admission (Jasso and Rosenzweig 
1995, p88).  In other words, the occupational disparity between skill-based and other 
immigrants in the US tends to diminish over time, although it still remains considerable. This 
is an important finding as in New Zealand it is sometimes assumed that the family category is 
a necessary, but unproductive element of the NZIP. This is because to get skilled migrants, 
they will often want reassurances that they can bring their family in later, and if they cannot 
they will be less inclined to migrate in the first place.  
Similarly, Canadian research (Duleep and Regets (1992) as cited in Cobb-Clark (2000)) 
concludes that Canada’s relatively greater emphasis on skills in selecting immigrants does 
not appear to give immigrants in Canada a long-term earnings advantage. 
The LisNZ data indicates significant differences by category in New Zealand. The results of 
that pilot indicated a significant difference between the employment rates of skilled/business 
as opposed to family/international migrants (86 percent labour force activity rate versus 56 
                                                                  
11   The authors note that data availability has previously limited the ability to assess immigration economic characteristics subsequent 
to immigration but the availability of a cohort study following a complete 1977 US  immigrant cohort  and their naturalization records 
through to 1990 is used in this article to  reach their findings.  
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percent). That data, however, includes refugee members as well which may result in an 
unrepresentative result for the family category labour force activity rate (New  Zealand 
Department of Labour 2004).  The data is short-term but in the future will allow greater 
analysis of whether the findings of Cobb-Clark and others apply in New Zealand. 
4.2  Barriers to employment 
The successful employment of migrants is dependent on a number of factors including the 
skill level of the migrants, willingness of employers to hire them and local labour market 
conditions.  Breaking down these barriers is critical to increasing the employment rates of 
migrants.  
The barriers to employment that are identified by the literature include poor English 
language skills and/or strong accents, recognition of qualifications, discrimination, inability 
to apply for jobs requiring a full driver’s licence, limited literacy skills and lacking in 
computing skills and experience pertaining to specific New  Zealand employment 
applications. Fletcher (1999) identifies English language proficiency, recognition of 
qualifications, access to family and social networks, and access to information (effectively 
in that order) as being of greatest importance to the successful settlement of migrants.  
The National Immigration Settlement Strategy released by the government at the end of 
2003 looked at the wider question of settlement and identified particular barriers that 
government views as existing for migrants to fully settle into New Zealand. These include 
an inability to access services and information, difficulty speaking New Zealand English 
and difficulty gaining employment. These three barriers were prioritised for the 2004 
Budget Round which allocated a package of $60 million over five years to fund a package 
of initiatives to support migrant settlement, including English for Speakers of Other 
Languages support for schools, adult ESOL training, New Zealand Qualifications Authority 
assessment of refugee qualifications, careers advice and labour market information, 
migrant resource services, refugee and migrant services and a national settlement 
structure. 
Participation and employment rates for migrants improve over time, and for some migrant 
groups they surpass the rates of the New Zealand born. But the poor results for recent 
migrants are cause for some concern. The relatively low employment rates compared to 
natives may indicate a negative impact on GDP per capita. Migrants would be able to 
make a greater contribution to growth if they were assisted to integrate into the labour 
market as early as possible after arrival. 
An important question, however, is whether the employment and participation rates for 
migrants as a whole are on average higher than the native population. If the migrant 
population has lower rates of participation and employment than the native population, but 
the migrant population is more highly skilled on average than the native population and 
therefore has higher productivity, then their impact on per capita growth may be positive. 
This would depend on the relative size of these two effects. 
The literature suggests that migrants are facing a number of barriers to employment. This 
analysis suggests that addressing barriers to employment should be a high priority for the 
government as it could increase the employment rate of migrants which would improve 
their contribution to growth. This is discussed further in the policy section of this paper.  
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5 Productivity 
Productivity measures the relationship between the output of goods and services and the 
inputs of resources used to produce them.  Labour productivity is output per hour worked.  
Labour productivity is a result of physical capital (machinery, equipment, infrastructure etc) 
per worker and multifactor productivity (the overall efficiency with which resources are used 
including the effects of changing technologies). There is typically little direct evidence on the 
productivity of migrants relative to the native population.  However, there is evidence of 
underemployment of skilled migrants, who are operating at a salary lower than their native 
counterpart, suggesting a productivity differential.  By underemployment we mean migrants 
not being employed in positions commensurate with their skills and training. 
This section discusses productivity issues that may arise from the underemployment of 
migrants, and skills transfers within firms that may have productivity effects. 
It is assumed that migrants are likely to make the greatest contribution to economic 
growth when they are fully employed in a position commensurate with their skills and 
training. The education levels of migrants can be of greatest benefit to the economy when 
migrants can be employed in a job that makes the most of their skills.  In some 
occupations, occupational licensing can act as a barrier to employment, creating 
difficulties for some migrants in obtaining long-term, sustainable employment and/or 
employment that uses their skills to the full.  
Estimates of GDP for each extra migrant employed should allow for the possibility that the 
new employees work different hours, and have different productivity, from existing 
employees. While highly skilled migrants employed in a position commensurate to their 
skills are likely to have higher labour productivity than the national average, conversely 
migrants with skills lower than the native average, or migrants employed in a position that 
does not utilise their skills can have lower than average labour productivity. The skill level 
of migrants is discussed further below. 
There is also a question as to whether economies of scale can be created as a result of 
migration. There is doubt as to whether migration creates economies of scale at the 
economy-wide level (OECD 2003a). There is the possibility that clustering effects may 
increase productivity in large cities although there is a lack of empirical evidence to back 
up this theory conclusively. Empirical studies done in other countries suggest that an 
estimated scale elasticity is unlikely to be greater than 1.2. In other words, net migration 
raises output by more than the increase in population. The OECD suggests that these 
figures are “highly speculative” but do imply that migration could have a notably positive 
effect on the economy. 
5.1 Income  convergence 
Income convergence is affected by labour utilisation, as well as by labour productivity. 
Income differential is measured in the literature by comparing the incomes of different 
migrant cohorts with the income of natives.  Evidence is usually presented in terms of the 
number of years that it takes for immigrant incomes to converge with those of the native 
population.  This section focuses on the New Zealand literature, including evidence of 
differences in the income differential for second-generation migrants.  
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While the evidence shows that participation and employment rates for immigrants appear 
to converge with rates for New Zealand born residents within 5-15 years, for most groups 
the convergence of income seems to take approximately twice as long. 
An earlier study (Poot 1993) looked at the median annual incomes of immigrants using 1986 
census data. The effects of age, occupation, country of-origin and years since migration were 
controlled for. Pacific Islanders had a large income disadvantage upon arrival and a relatively 
steep ‘years since migration-income profile’. Their income did not reach parity with 
New Zealand born workers until 35 or 40 years in New Zealand. UK born immigrants did not 
face an initial entry disadvantage, typically outperforming New Zealand born workers from the 
start. Australians had similar outcomes to New Zealand born workers. 
The Winkelmann study (Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998) showed that on average, new 
skilled migrants (those who had been in New Zealand less than five years) in the labour force 
had an income 20 percent below that of New  Zealand born residents with similar 
characteristics and qualifications. An NZIER report (2003) notes the differential noted in the 
Winkelmann study may in fact be more marked today because that study focussed on 
migrants who were in employment, and since the report was published migration flows from 
non-Anglophone countries have increased. In addition to this, recent immigrant cohorts have 
been younger, more likely to be involved in full-time education and less likely to be actively 
participating in the labour force. On the other hand recent immigration cohorts have been 
more skilled as high demand has ensured a high pass mark and this may to some extent 
offset their tendency to not actively participate in the labour force so much as in the past.
12 It 
is difficult to ascertain which factor would have the greatest effect on income, but is 
reasonable to assume that the incomes of new skilled migrants are unlikely to have improved 
from the 20 percent discrepancy discovered in the Winklemann study. This indicates that, at 
least in the initial stages after entry, and probably also after this stage, migrants have lower 
levels of labour productivity than natives. 
This lower productivity and slow convergence can be explained, at least in the short term, 
because migrants must adjust to a new country and its culture, workplace routines, 
language, and other factors. This adjustment period will vary depending on the nature of 
the migrants (such as their country of origin) but it is sensible to expect that it would partly 
explain the findings of lower productivity and slow convergence.   
5.2 Under-employment 
NZIER (2003) research investigated the economic cost of under-employed skilled 
migrants finding that the major cost component came from reduced production as a result 
of migrants not fully utilising their skills. In this situation there are unrealised gains from 
immigration. While migrants are participating, their sub-optimal participation is not the best 
use of inputs available. 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) show that immigrants had distinctively higher 
education levels than New  Zealand born persons.  Immigrants were about 30 percent 
more likely to have a post-school qualification than New Zealand born persons in any of 
the census years and that recent immigrants were between 40-50 percent more likely to 
have those qualifications.  Migrants had a higher proportion of university qualifications and 
a lower proportion of vocational qualifications, a distinction that is likely to have been 
perpetuated under the mechanics of the pass mark system during the late 1990s. 
                                                                  
12   The pass mark for SMC started off very high but was lowered in September 2004 before rising again.  
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This greater level of education can lead to an increase in the overall levels of knowledge, 
skills and experience.  Most immigrants to New Zealand are highly skilled, well qualified 
people. This increases the overall knowledge level in the economy and the stock and 
quality of the skills base (considering of course the skill level of the emigrating population). 
In this respect, work on the “brain drain” which became a fear in the early 2000s indicated 
that in fact the flows of migrants at that time would be more appropriately called a “brain 
exchange” rather than a “brain drain” (Bushnell and Choy 2001). This is discussed further 
below. 
In New  Zealand, the current policy settings focus on facilitating the entry of skilled 
migrants. Sixty percent of the total Immigration Programme is allocated to the skilled 
category. In addition, the Minister has the ability to reallocate any unused places in the 
other streams to the skilled category. During the early 2000s the high demand for 
migration to New Zealand meant that the pass mark under the General Skills Category 
(GSC) had to be increased quite significantly to manage the number of residence permits 
that could be offered.  In practice this means that between 1999-2003 a GSC applicant 
would be unlikely to be accepted unless they had a tertiary qualification.  The policy 
argument for focusing on skilled migration has been that skilled migrants will make a 
greater contribution to economic activity than migrants in other categories would, or than 
less skilled migrants. The discussion above confirms that skilled migrants have better 
participation and employment rates than migrants who are not selected for their skills, but 
it also indicates that there are still barriers to skilled migrants reaching employment at their 
greatest level of social return. This policy may be revisited in light of current labour market 
conditions in New Zealand and high demand for unskilled labour. 
5.3 Emigration 
New Zealand is both a source and a host country. Emigration can affect average labour 
productivity and its impact will depend on the characteristics of emigrants. Even though 
many New Zealanders leave New Zealand to live and work overseas, many also decide to 
return (Bushnell and Choy 2001, Glass and Choy 2001). This section discusses the role of 
New Zealand as a source country of migrants, and the potential impact this may have on 
growth. 
Highly skilled New Zealand workers may experience pull factors such as better-paying 
jobs and the attraction of larger labour markets with a greater variety of job opportunities. 
The phenomenon of skilled workers departing the country is often referred to as a “brain 
drain”. Much of the literature argues that emigration has negative effects on the source 
country – the “brain drain” effect. The argument is that the propensity to emigrate 
increases with skills, so higher skilled workers leave while less-skilled workers remain.  
However, the source country may also benefit from emigration. 
The “brain drain” has two principal negative effects on the well-being of those who remain 
in the source country as discussed by Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003).  
First, emigration reduces per capita income in the source country as the economy loses 
skilled workers who contribute more to GDP than do the unskilled. The economy loses 
income that could be taxed and redistributed.  The source country also loses the returns 
on its public investment in the human capital of the departing workers which is enjoyed by 
the host country.   
Secondly, the source economy suffers a decumulation of human capital, reducing 
productivity and economic growth.  Having an on average lower-skilled labour force would  
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reduce average labour productivity, and consequently would render physical capital less 
productive. Overall this can lead to lower wages and incomes. If a “brain drain” led to a 
relative scarcity of skilled labour this could push up wages for skilled labour resulting in 
greater wage inequality. Policy implications of skill shortages are discussed further at 
Section 7.  
In addition, it may be that because of positive externalities and network effects, a critical 
mass of skills in certain fields is necessary to achieve higher levels of growth in certain 
industries.  A small country with a thin supply of skilled labour will find it harder to form 
clusters of expertise.   
So, has emigration negatively impacted upon growth in New Zealand? In the early 2000s 
there was fear of a “brain drain” taking the minds of New Zealand’s youngest and brightest 
offshore. The data, however, suggested that there was no net brain drain from 
New Zealand (Bushnell and Choy 2001).  Theoretical reasons also exist for why it would 
not necessarily be expected to see a “brain drain” from New Zealand.  First, it may be that 
wages are simply lower for all skill levels in New  Zealand, as a result of low capital 
investment or lack of agglomeration externalities.  In that case, the flow of emigrants could 
be expected to be evenly drawn from workers throughout the distribution, if the poor are 
as likely as the rich to find better opportunities overseas.  This would lead us to predict 
steady net migration out of the country until wages are equalized across countries; on the 
other hand, there may be compensating differentials due to quality of life issues.  It may 
be no exaggeration to say that migration to and from New Zealand is driven more by 
preferences than by skills.  It is possible that those who leave New  Zealand have a 
stronger preference for money, while those coming to New  Zealand have a stronger 
preference for New Zealand’s way of life.  This could explain why New Zealand wages are 
lower, but would not result in a skill bias in migration flows. 
Second, as noted previously, New  Zealand has experienced a strong rise in wage 
inequality; in other rich countries, the rise in wage inequality has been subdued or 
nonexistent.  As predicted in the labour market models, skilled labour is expected to 
migrate to regions of greater inequality, while unskilled labour migrates to regions of less 
inequality. Thus it may be that skilled workers are migrating to New  Zealand from 
countries with less inequality.  This has been empirically tested elsewhere (Borjas 1987) 
but not for New Zealand. 
Emigration can also have positive consequences for the source country.  First, 
remittances from emigrants can play an important part in the income of the source 
country.  Secondly, the “brain drain” can also increase the potential returns to skilled 
workers who do not emigrate and can induce individuals to up-skill, leading to an 
accumulation of human capital and contributing to economic growth.  The source country 
can benefit from the spill-over effects of knowledge diffusion and imitation from the skilled 
emigrants who contribute to growth-inducing innovation in the host country. As discussed 
above, the role of the diaspora further complicates the issue of the brain drain. Finally, the 
source country can benefit from the human and financial capital accumulated by returning 
migrants during their sojourn in the host country.   
5.4 Capital  investment 
Migrants can add to the pool of human capital, but can also bring with them physical 
capital. The amount of physical capital in the economy is a determinant of the level of 
economic growth. New Zealand’s business stream migration categories demonstrate an  
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explicit link between capital and labour flows. There are other less direct aspects to this 
relationship examined by the literature. 
Migrants cause factor price movements by changing the capital-labour ratio: where 
migrants have less capital than the average native, immigration increases the supply of 
labour relative to that of capital and vice versa (Kemnitz 2001). Kemnitz uses an 
endogenous growth model to illustrate that immigration will only benefit an average native 
if, and only if, the average immigrant possesses more capital than the average native, ie 
the capital-labour ratio is increased. This is in contrast to standard neoclassical results. 
It is uncertain whether migrants have, on average, greater capital than natives in 
New Zealand. The only category focused on capital is the business stream. The Investor 
Category closed in June 2005 and a new category came into existence in July 2005. The 
new category requires business investors to advance $2 million to the New  Zealand 
Government for 5 years. After two years migrants can withdraw a portion of their funds 
and invest in an approved business. 
Lloyd (1996) suggests that globalisation literature emphasises the role of capital flows in 
the form of direct foreign investments and their links to the growth of international trade in 
commodities but neglects the international migration of people. In terms of the activities of 
multinational firms or enterprises, he suggests that some relationships between the 
international movement of goods and labour are inextricably linked to international capital 
movement, and that in the long run immigration may have a strong effect on the patterns 
of trade and direct foreign investment.  He uses a Markusen specific factor model to 
predict the magnitude of gains and losses to factor incomes when there is a capital or 
labour inflow into the Australian economy (Lloyd 1996, p78).
13
  Some of the literature 
suggests that it is usually capital which follows labour, posited on the idea that immigrant 
labour has the effect of raising the marginal productivity of capital and partly due to an 
increase in aggregate demand inducing a transfer of capital. The model used by Lloyd 
indicates that capital inflows may increase the incentives for labour to migrate more than 
the migration of labour increases the incentives for capital to flow to Australia. 
5.5 Global  connectedness 
Global connectedness, within the New Zealand government context, is a term used to 
refer to as the actual flow of factors (such as the goods, services, capital, people 
knowledge, ideas and technology) between countries. This compares with openness, 
which is the absence of formal or trade barriers to factor flows. Global connectedness 
allows us to take advantage of the larger international market and access the latest 
technology and ideas.  Access to technology, knowledge and ideas is likely to be a key 
element in improving New  Zealand’s productivity performance. In terms of the growth 
accounting framework this can be considered as part of multi-factor productivity. 
The OECD sees the large size of migration flows to and from New Zealand as important 
because of the connections maintained by immigration and New Zealand expatriates with 
their countries of origin (OECD 2003b). This increases the opportunities for exchanging 
knowledge and ideas which the OECD notes can be a powerful driver of innovation.  
New  Zealand’s physical distance from the rest of the word is a barrier to exchange. 
Treasury has done some work investigating whether migrant stocks offset the effects of 
                                                                  
13   The results can be imputed to be similar in New Zealand given the same basic feature of the New Zealand economy as being a 
large-scale recipient of both capital and labour for the majority of the last 150 years.  
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distance, by presenting detailed data on New  Zealander-born people overseas, and 
overseas-born people in New Zealand (Bryant and Law 2004).  The paper suggests a 
need to temper expectations about benefits from the New  Zealand diaspora, but also 
suggests a potentially important role for immigrants to New Zealand. There is a large pool 
of New  Zealand citizens currently overseas, many of whom will return to their native 
country (Lidgard and Gilson 2002). When they do so, they will bring new ideas, higher 
human capital and international networks – all positive for New Zealand growth. 
In regard to the diaspora, Bryant, Genc and Law (2004) estimate there were almost 
460,000 New Zealand-born living outside New Zealand in 2001, of which 80 percent were 
living in Australia.
14
  Their findings suggest that the number of New Zealanders in other 
countries is much smaller than is often assumed. The United Kingdom, for example, is 
home to less than 60,000 New Zealanders.  It may be possible for New Zealand to tap 
into the networks and links of the diaspora, although a cost-effective option for doing so is 
not obvious.  
Sustained productivity growth may come from increased access to, and incentive to 
develop, new technology, knowledge and ideas. Direct people-to-people contact can be 
key in accessing and adapting these. Migration facilitates international contacts and is a 
way to access larger and more varied stocks of capital and labour. Larger markets can 
increase productivity through larger scale production which permits specialisation, 
economies of scale and learning by doing, and through stronger incentives to innovate, for 
example through allowing the recovery of the fixed costs of innovation and competition 
that provides incentives to maximise efficiency and innovation. 
There is evidence that the productivity of the native population may be improved by the 
presence of migrant workers.  Some of the literature suggests that expatriate workers 
employed by foreign multinationals transfer labour market skills to native employees 
(Lloyd 1996, p77).  There does not seem to be a quantitative estimate of the extent of 
skills transfer from temporary residents to local workers but if a significant relationship 
exists then this adds weight to the argument that the presence of skilled migrant workers 
can increase the productivity of native firms.  
Immigration is one way to improve links from New Zealand with the migrant’s country of 
origin.
15
  This can be done at an individual, organisational or governmental level. 
Improving global connectedness can facilitate greater overseas market access for 
New Zealand businesses, improvement in exchange of new technologies and processes 
and improving the New  Zealand Inc image overseas. Greater market access can be 
achieved through improved export penetration for firms with multilingual, multicultural 
sales people and management with multi-country contacts. 
The literature suggests that there are significant links between past immigration and the 
growth of exports (Lloyd 1996, p80)  One study suggested that the employment of East 
Asian workers by Australian firms increased the East Asian export orientation of firms.  
This was attributed to assets of the East Asian employees such as knowledge of 
appropriate business ethics and practices, personal contacts with other East Asian 
peoples and specific cultural knowledge. In addition to export orientation being improved 
when native people from the export markets were employed, there was evidence of an 
increase in outward foreign direct investment towards that country as well (Lloyd 1996, 
p81). Lloyd accepts that more research is required to separate the various effects that 
may be involved in increasing exports and improvement in other global links, such as the 
                                                                  
14   New Zealander is defined as being a person born in New Zealand.  
15   The number of New Zealand citizens living offshore is also of relevance here.  
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general rapid market growth in Asia.  He concludes that immigration may have a “strong 
effect” on trade and direct foreign investment patterns. 
The evaluation of the Business Investor category in 1999 indicated that some Business 
Migrants were involved in exporting and importing businesses, with exporting going mainly 
to the country of birth of the Business Investor. These activities improve New Zealand’s 
global connectedness through trade with a range of countries mainly throughout Asia but 
also including Fiji, USA, United Kingdom and Australia. This will also improve wider 
international linkages that New Zealand has with the world.  
6 Wider  Impacts 
Migration can have wider economic impacts than purely through the avenues to per capita 
growth set out in the growth accounting framework. These wider impacts are set out 
briefly below. While they are not central to the core discussion in this paper they are 
briefly discussed here for the sake of completeness. 
6.1 Fiscal  impact 
The fiscal impact of an increase in immigration can be significant, particularly where tax 
contributions do not match the receipt of public expenditures such as health and 
education on the new immigrants.  It can be difficult to accurately gauge the fiscal costs 
that migrants impose on society.  Different results can be achieved depending on the 
measures taken and the way that private and public good provision is treated.  In the 
context of their work on Britain, McCarthy and Collins (2001, p23) conclude only that it is 
“quite possible that fiscal externalities erode the gains from free migration”.  
For the US, Borjas (1995, p4) shows that there was an increase in the fiscal costs of 
migrants to the state between the 1970 and 1990 censuses.  Immigrants shifted from 
being less likely to receive welfare to more likely over the time period.  This is correlated 
with their tendency to be less educated.  It is difficult to accurately reconcile the costs that 
migrants impose on a society with the benefits that they create.  Borjas (1994) provides a 
set of estimates of the costs and benefits of migration in the United States using 1990 
census data. He estimates the net benefit to the welfare system (tax income minus cash 
benefits and means-tested entitlements) at around $US60 billion. This is a simplistic 
analysis in that it assumes a zero marginal cost of providing other social services to 
migrants, such as infrastructure.  
McCarthy and Collins (2001, p22) note that if you use an average cost Borjas’s 
calculations would indicate immigrants are a large net cost. Yet again, the inclusion of 
public good provision would reduce this cost (eg defence). The evidence gathered in 
New Zealand would not support a similar conclusion here. 
In 2003 BERL (Nana, Sanderson and Goodchild 2003) carried out a study using 
demographic and other data from the 2001 census and government accounts data for the 
year to June 2002 to estimate the fiscal impact of migrants to New Zealand in the June 
2002 fiscal year,
16
  That study estimated that migrants to New Zealand had a positive net 
                                                                  
16   In this paper migrants are defined as persons born overseas but usually resident in New Zealand.  
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fiscal impact of $1.7billion in the year to June 2002.
17
  Revenue from the sub-groups of the 
migrant population is a function of income. Therefore, as noted by the study, the income 
of each group is strongly dependent on its age profile.
18
  The impact of the age-profile of 
various migrant groups is to lead to high income earnings for migrant groups but this 
difference can be attributed to the comparative age-composition. 
Two sub-groupings were calculated to have a negative fiscal impact; new migrants from 
Asia and new migrants from the Pacific Islands. Their fiscal impact became positive as 
their duration of residence in New Zealand increased (Nana et al 2003). 
Export education is an industry that has a significant fiscal impact. It was responsible for 
the substantial growth in temporary permit applications from 00/01 until 03/04, although 
demand decline during 2005. Export education has two important links to immigration: 
first, migrants who are studying, while not currently participating in the economy, are 
increasing the resident stock of human capital and are settling in to New Zealand; second, 
export education is a $2 billion industry in New  Zealand providing employment 
opportunities for New  Zealanders and foreign exchange earnings; and finally, foreign 
students who return to their source country can act as international contacts thus 
increasing New Zealand’s global connectedness. 
6.2 Economic  costs 
In addition to the fiscal effects, immigrants can impose wider economic costs (and 
benefits).  Although there are direct fiscal costs when welfare payments are made to 
unemployed migrants, the economic consequences of unemployment are likely to be 
much higher. In addition, there may be pressures on infrastructure. 
The characteristics of the migrant population provide a basis for establishing the costs of 
migrants. In New Zealand new migrants have an unemployment rate above the native 
average, and their income differential (depending on sub-group) takes some time to 
converge with native incomes. The age structure of the migrant population, which puts 
migrants disproportionately into the working age group means that they may have a lower 
tendency to be utilising publicly funded education and healthcare. 
An increase in immigration can put pressure on infrastructure, for example it can lead to 
increased demand for housing, schools, hospitals and roading.  However, the overall 
impact is likely to be relatively small since the net migration effects are small, although 
there may be some geographic concentration (NZIER 2003).  
                                                                  
17   Government revenue was assessed at $5.8 billion and was comprised of income tax, GST and petrol, alcohol and tobacco excises. 
Government expenditure was assessed at $4.1 billion and was comprised of education, health, New Zealand Superannuation, 
Work and Income benefits and student allowances. The net contribution of migrants was slightly higher than that of the 
New Zealand born.  The migrant population contribution to income tax revenue totalled $4,121 million in the year.   
18
  The study assumes that migrants behave in a manner similar to those born in New Zealand within the same age and income 
category in relation to expenditure characteristics.  
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Migrant inflows to New Zealand have typically concentrated themselves in major urban 
centres, with Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch being the greatest receivers of 
migrants (Newell 2001). More than two thirds of the migrants who had arrived in 
New Zealand over the five year period prior to March 2001 had settled in the Auckland 
region. The overseas born account for 34 percent of Auckland’s resident population 
compared to 20 percent for the whole of New Zealand (Nana et al 2003). Auckland also 
receives a larger proportion of new migrants. Thirty four percent of migrants resident in 
Auckland are new compared to the New  Zealand-wide proportion of 28 percent. The 
increase in temporary migration has also contributed to the perception of Auckland as a 
migrant city. This appearance is likely to have been responsible for some of the increased 
political attention that migration has received in recent years. The new SMC seeks to 
address this by awarding bonus points to job offers places outside Auckland. 
While cities that experience large migrant inflows can experience consumption gains, 
such as those of Auckland in the mid 1990s (particularly in the property and construction 
sectors) rapid population increases can also have negative effects, including pressure on 
infrastructure and services. An increase in demand for housing is the oft-cited example for 
Auckland. An increase in demand for housing can have a positive effect for property 
owners by increasing prices, but can negatively impact on homebuyers. Increased 
demand is only likely to lead to a rise in prices if there is a supply constraint.  
Despite this, the inflow of migrants into Auckland is sometimes pointed to as the major 
reason for infrastructure pressures in Auckland, such as traffic problems. There has been 
an argument that the higher net migration of the mid-1990s resulted in house prices 
increasing to the point that they threatened to have wider inflationary impacts. The high 
inflows in 2002/03 have also been correlated with rising property prices (OECD 2003a).  
Rising house prices increase the returns to investing in property. As a result more people 
may invest in property, reducing the capital available for productive investment. 
Conversely, public good provision does not incur any extra cost for each additional 
migrant.   
There can also be positive agglomeration and economies of scale effects as a result of 
population concentration. It is difficult to find evidence on whether this has occurred in 
Auckland as a result of migration. If there have been scale effects then they would 
increase per capita GDP growth, with potentially significant effects. Further investigation 
into this would provide useful information to policy makers on potential economic gains 
from migration. It may also have an effect on the perception of a concentrated population 
of migrants as being a negative effect of migration.   
7 Policy  implications 
7.1 Introduction 
As stated earlier, government has a strong influence over immigration policy as it 
ultimately determines who will be admitted to New  Zealand and for how long. It is 
therefore important that government ensures it has an evidence-based immigration policy 
programme designed to select migrants who will bring the greatest net benefits to the 
incumbent population.   
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This section presents policy implications that can be drawn from the evidence presented 
above. Policy implications are considered for labour utilisation and labour productivity, and 
include a high level consideration of the size of the New Zealand Immigration Programme 
(NZIP). 
7.2  Policy implications for labour utilisation 
As set out in the analysis in Section 4 above, improving the participation and employment 
rates of migrants is likely to bring economic benefits to New Zealand. If highly skilled migrants 
are employed in jobs commensurate with their skills and the returns to skills are shared with 
the native population then there should be an improvement in GDP per capita. 
As previously stated there are two main levers through which New Zealand can attempt to 
improve migrants’ participation rates. First, the entry requirements need to be set so that 
those people entering New Zealand have the skills and characteristics that are in demand 
in the labour market. Secondly, there are barriers to employment that exist within the host 
community which may be able to be partially addressed through government policies.  
7.2.1 Entry  requirements 
The first policy lever has recently had major adjustments made to it. The SMC, introduced 
in 2004, aims to let in migrants who will be able to quickly settle and contribute to 
New Zealand. The huge majority of migrants admitted under this category are now likely 
to currently work in New Zealand or have job offers. It is probable that the policy changes 
made will therefore ensure greater labour force participation and employment rates for the 
cohort of migrants entering New  Zealand under this new category. The initial data 
supports this; in 2004/05 87 percent of principal applicants had a job or offer of skilled 
employment in New  Zealand. Sixty one percent had a main occupation in an area of 
immediate or long-term skill shortage. Given the current tight labour market, this outcome 
for migrants may be relieving some of the existing labour market constraints on growth. 
Temporary work policy has increasingly become a pathway through to residency. There is 
evidence that the new SMC will continue to encourage prospective migrants on temporary 
work policies to “upgrade” to residence policy. Eighty eight percent of principal applicants 
approved for residence in 2004/05 had previously held a work, student or visitor permit. In 
this case it remains important that New Zealand’s work policy facilitates the quick entry of 
migrants to fill job offers. New Zealand is competing against other countries to attract and 
retain the best migrants, delays in processing are likely to be one factor that migrants 
consider when making a relocation decision. The use of the expression of interest system 
is one way to manage expectations but the government needs to ensure that processing 
times are the shortest possible while being compatible with ensuring appropriate scrutiny. 
7.2.2  Reducing barriers to employment 
This second policy lever is important in dealing with those migrants whom the literature 
indicates are likely to have poor participation and employment outcomes. There is a large 
stock of migrants currently in New Zealand who fit this description so government needs to 
consider interventions to assist the stock of existing migrants, in addition to trying to get the 
right flow. There are a wide variety of policy responses to deal with barriers to employment.  
In particular the literature indicates that improvements in the use of the English language 
will assist migrants to move into employment. Results from the inflows of the SMC show  
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there has been a shift in the emphasis of the flow of migrants towards Anglophone 
countries. However, there will still be a flow of migrants from non-Anglophone countries 
under all categories and a significant existing stock. 
Proficiency in the English language makes all the initial aspects of the settlement process 
easier for migrants.  In the medium term it is critical to ensuring good labour market 
outcomes. Since November 1998, non-principal applicants under the skilled and business 
categories (and principal business applicants prior to November 2002) who do not meet 
the minimum English language standards have been required to pre-purchase English for 
Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) training. There are some concerns about the level 
of take-up of this tuition.  The government has two options for increasing the English 
language proficiency of migrants. Either the English language requirement for entry could 
be increased (and/or it could be introduced for the family stream as well) or there could be 
greater ESOL provision and support for migrants after they have arrived. The latter 
suggestion is likely to have greater upfront costs, assuming there is not a return to the 
previous mechanism of an English language bond. Previous experience of the bond was 
that it had very low take up rates so it is not recommended that this policy be 
reintroduced. It is possible that further work could be done to consider a more assertive 
approach. For example, those under the work-to-residence route could be asked to 
provide evidence that they have attended and passed the requisite course before they are 
approved for residence. 
In 2002 the English language requirements (IELTS scores) for the skilled and business 
stream were increased. Increasing the requirements further would reduce the pool of 
eligible migrants, which may be sustainable during times of high demand, but there would 
likely be pressure to lower it if demand dropped off. Therefore consideration of increasing 
the requirement would need to be balanced against the desirability of consistency in 
migration policy. The Settlement Strategy 2004 put some emphasis on ESOL provision 
and evaluation of this provision should inform future investment in programmes. There 
has been some initial evidence from previous programmes that there can be low take-up 
of courses, but this may be due to insufficient awareness in migrant communities about its 
availability. In this case the use of Migrant Settlement Centres to disseminate information 
should be assessed to ensure their effectiveness. 
In general the changes to the new SMC have seen an increase in the arrival of migrants 
from Anglophone countries, such as Britain and the United States. Having a greater 
proportion of migrants with high levels of English literacy is likely to improve labour force 
participation and employment rates, given the evidence presented above that English 
language proficiency is a key barrier to employment. 
There is a more difficult issue around the attitude of employers towards migrants. There is 
some evidence, mostly anecdotal, that employers are hesitant to employ migrants – often 
due to their perception that heavy accents are a negative attribute. The Auckland 
Chambers of Commerce have done some excellent work in matching highly skilled 
migrants with employment among their members. This use of networking can be used to 
break down barriers and illustrate to employers the great pool of talent that migrants can 
provide. It is less clear to see the role of government here, but the initiation of such 
programmes in the private sector is promising and where possible should be encouraged.  
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7.2.3  Skilled vs family-based outcomes  
The literature outlined in the preceding discussion has illustrated that the difference in 
outcomes for skilled versus family-based migrants may not be quite as significant as has 
previously been assumed. This is one particular area whether further work would be 
particularly warranted. New Zealand has been taking greater numbers of skilled migrants 
over the last ten years, and these migrants are now beginning to sponsor family migrants.  
Demand in the family stream continues to outnumber places available and from 
September 2004 priority has been given to partners and dependent children over other 
applicants in this stream. Pressure on this stream is likely to increase and it would be 
prudent for the government to prepare for this by further investigating the outcomes of this 
stream, and ways to improve them. 
Australia has been facing this problem and their solution has been to implement a queuing 
system. Around 40 percent of Australia’s Migration Programme in 2003/04 was for family 
migrants.19. The 2002-03 program outcome of 108,072 places, included 40,794 (37.7 
percent) in the Family Stream. The Australian Minister of Immigration makes decisions on 
parent caps as necessary during the Program Year. Once the limit or cap has been 
reached, no further visas are granted in that visa class in the Program Year. On 1 July 
2003, there were about 23,210 people who had lodged applications for parent visas. Of 
these, approximately 16,400 were in the queue. The offshore component of this pipeline 
comprises about 17,140 people while 6,070 are in the onshore component (Australian 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 2003).  
7.3  Policy implications for migrant productivity 
As set out in the growth accounting framework, labour productivity is a result of capital per 
worker and multifactor productivity. There is little direct evidence in New Zealand on the 
productivity of migrants relative to the native population; however, there was evidence of 
underemployment of skilled migrants, who are operating at a salary lower than their native 
counterpart, suggesting a productivity differential. While disentangling the effects that 
migrant workers have for productivity can be a black box question, the analysis above has 
policy implications relating to the skills of migrants, including technology spill-over 
questions and investment. 
7.3.1  Increasing skills of migrants 
The objectives of the SMC are to grant residence to people who demonstrate that they 
have skills to fill identified needs and opportunities in New Zealand; are able to transfer 
those skills to New  Zealand and link with local needs and opportunities; are able to 
demonstrate an ability to contribute to New Zealand both economically and socially; and 
are able to demonstrate an ability to successfully settle in New Zealand. In meeting these 
objectives the SMC aims to maximise and accelerate the contribution of immigration to 
New  Zealand's capacity building, sustainable growth and innovation, global 
connectedness, and thriving and inclusive communities through focusing on a range of 
source regions to achieve a balanced programme and linking global talent with local 
opportunities. 
                                                                  
19   Australia has a separate Humanitarian programme of around 11,000 places.  
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The Borjas immigration surplus model suggests that the greatest gains from immigration 
may arise when the arrival of immigrants reduces local labour costs.  This will tend to 
occur in those segments of the labour market in which wages are sensitive to labour 
supply. The weight of empirical evidence suggests that the wages of skilled workers are 
significantly more responsive to a shift in supply than the wages of unskilled workers.  
This is partly because most governments regulate wages at the low end (eg. through 
minimum wage laws) but not at the high end; and skilled labour and capital tend to be 
complements, whereas unskilled labour and capital tend to be substitutes.   
It is also reasonable to assume that skilled immigrants generate larger positive 
externalities than unskilled immigrants (for example they disseminate more knowledge, 
pay more tax, and consume more); and the evidence (Nana et al 2003) indicates that 
government expenditure on income support and welfare is lower for skilled immigrants 
than for unskilled immigrants. 
These points suggest that increasing the skill composition of the immigrant flow can 
potentially generate economic gains for a country.  However, the gains may be associated 
with a redistribution of income from native workers within the affected labour market to 
owners of capital (shareholders, investors).  The policy question is whether the efficiency 
gains outweigh any social costs arising from this redistribution (which raises a prior 
question of whether there are any significant social costs, or whether there are simply 
winners and losers). 
There is a potential trade-off between distributional impacts and efficiency gains from 
immigration:  the literature suggests that countries are unlikely to achieve real gains from 
immigration (in terms of an increase in national income) without some negative impact on 
the local workforce. It follows that immigration policies that are driven by a concern to 
minimise negative impacts on the local workforce are unlikely to be consistent with 
maximising the net benefits to a country from immigration. 
In some respects New  Zealand immigration policies are focused on minimising the 
impacts of immigration on native workers.
20
  This approach may be costly to New Zealand, 
in terms of lost opportunity for economic gain.  Protecting the local workforce may be a 
high priority for government, but it is important to understand the nature and level of the 
trade-offs involved, in order to make informed decisions.     
World demand for skilled migrants 
Migrant preferences affect migration decisions. The effect that this will have on demand 
for residence in New Zealand is dependent on whether migrant groups have homogenous 
or heterogeneous preferences. If viewed as homogenous then it must be accepted that 
countries compete with each other for skilled migrants. One study showed increases in 
the number of skilled migrants arriving in the United States from a particular sending 
country are related to a reduction in the numbers of skilled individuals from that country 
applying for an Australian visa (Cobb-Clark and Connolly 1996). In this light New Zealand 
immigration policy developments must always take account of the relative attractiveness 
of countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States. Competition for skilled 
migrants is likely to increase in the future as the pressures of populating ageing start to be 
felt across developed countries and the demand for skilled labour increases. 
                                                                  
20   For example, according to DOL’s 1999 Briefing to Ministers, the purpose of the Immigration Programme is to “take account of… 
New Zealand’s capacity to absorb inflows”.  This suggests that the concern is to avoid/minimise negative impacts rather than to 
maximise the net gains to New Zealand.    
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It is unlikely that migrants are distinctly heterogeneous or homogenous in their migration 
decisions. Understanding the motivation of migrants is difficult. But the shift to a greater 
number of onshore residence applications suggests that if migrant preferences are 
homogenous New  Zealand needs to have very competitive policies for work and other 
temporary permits, not just residence permits. In practice the development of New Zealand 
immigration policy usually provides country comparisons between proposed changes to 
policy and the comparative policy in other similar countries.  This should continue. 
At present, the United States remains the favoured destination for many highly skilled 
foreign workers, but its continued competitiveness in attracting the best and brightest will 
require substantial changes in immigration policies and administrative mechanisms. An 
increasing proportion of highly skilled enter through temporary categories with little 
prospect of permanent residence within a reasonable period. The numbers involved are 
very significant and the pressures that drive them are likely to continue over the near 
future (Martin and Lowell 2004).  Another aspect to this is that the United States has 
increased visa restrictions in the wake of 9/11 and the increased security has made it 
more difficult for some foreign workers to enter. 
7.3.2 Emigration 
This paper discussed the role of emigration in the migration system. What does this mean 
for policy in New  Zealand? Again, it is dependent on which effects would dominate 
behaviour.  If labour does not respond to international wage differentials, then 
New  Zealand can safely invest in human capital without concern that educated 
New Zealanders will flee the country.  What is the effect of high wage inequality on skilled 
workers’ decisions to emigrate? This may to some extent offset the incentives to leave for 
higher average wages in other countries, whereas low-wage labour faces greater 
constraints to emigration (due to lack of resources and/or information). If the wage 
inequality offset does not significantly affect decisions then New Zealand can be viewed 
as a component of an integrated global labour market. This argument has implications for 
work on skills training and education for New Zealanders.   
There is a lack of definitive literature on whether greater investment in skills by 
government leads to higher emigration and/or less immigration of skilled workers, thereby 
offsetting the effects of these policies on New  Zealand’s aggregate economic 
performance.  Evidence in this area would be essential for understanding the impact of 
investments in human capital on growth.  If human capital flows overseas to the country 
offering the highest wages then how would this affect government’s incentives to increase 
the number of people undertaking tertiary training? 
Perhaps this debate illustrates the need for greater links between work on education and 
immigration policy.  At the very least it suggests that investments in education should be 
considered with a long-term lens which considers how to encourage educated 
New Zealanders to stay in New Zealand, or at least to return to New Zealand. The student 
loans policy announced in 2005 allowing students who remain in New Zealand to be free 
from interest payments is an example of this. The aim must be for the government to invest 
in skills that assist economic growth in New Zealand and it is appropriate to consider how 
these skills can be retained. As discussed above in relation to global connectedness, the 
government should also consider how to ensure New Zealand remains an attractive return 
option for those people who do leave the country at some point.  
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7.3.3  Skill and labour shortages  
The New Zealand government is currently undertaking work on the interface of various 
responses to labour market shortages. The use of immigration policy is one possible 
response to periods of skill and labour market shortages. There is no agreed definition of 
skill and labour shortages.  However in broad terms government has used the term ‘skill’ 
to refer to occupations requiring significant specialist, managerial or technical expertise 
while ‘labour’ has been used to denote low or unskilled occupations that can be learnt in a 
relatively short period of time. 
Could immigration make a greater contribution to economic growth if it could be exploited 
to alleviate skill shortages and encourage expansion within businesses that have said 
they are currently constrained by skill/labour shortages? Since 1999 New Zealand has 
been facing a tightening labour market. The official unemployment rate has fallen from 6.3 
percent in December 1999 to 3.6 percent in the December 2005 Household Labour Force 
Survey. Skills and labour shortages are high and are forming a major constraint on 
business expansion.  There can be a number of underlying reasons why these shortages 
exist and the use of immigration policy to alleviate the shortages would not address all of 
these reasons. 
Skill shortages constrict economic growth by constraining business production (or 
expansion). They can also push up wages for certain types of skills leading to wage 
inflation in excess of productivity growth. Since 1999, the New Zealand labour market has 
been tightening – unemployment has decreased from 6.3 percent end-1999 to 3.6 percent 
at the end of 2005, while employment has increased by 10 percent over the same period.  
Employers have reported considerable and sustained difficulties in recruiting suitable 
staff, with 45 percent of firms reporting difficulty in finding skilled staff and 25 percent 
finding it difficult to recruit unskilled staff (NZIER 2004, March).  
A 2001/2002 work permit review concluded that it was not appropriate to use immigration 
temporary work policy to enable employers to meet shortages for low or unskilled labour 
caused by recruitment difficulties. Working holiday schemes were seen as a potential 
source of labour for addressing temporary or seasonal shortages. The risk of businesses 
being constrained by the unavailability of labour prepared to work at the going wage rates 
was noted, but immigration was not considered to be an appropriate policy response.
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An important question is establishing why the shortages exist. Immigration is a possible 
short-term intervention for shortages caused by skill gaps while training and education 
initiatives are underway to resolve the shortages.  If shortages are absolute and ongoing 
then immigration could be viewed as a possible longer-term intervention. Skill shortages 
can be met by bringing in labour from overseas.  However, if shortages are the result of 
poor pay or conditions or inadequate training, bringing in overseas workers could 
adversely impact on employment opportunities for the host country and may reduce the 
incentives for both businesses and individuals to invest in education and training.   
Should New Zealand be more flexible in facilitating lower-skilled workers where it is in 
New  Zealand’s longer-term economic interests and where risks can be effectively 
managed? Particular areas experiencing labour shortages are the construction industry 
and the horticulture industry.  Use of the occupation shortages list is a possible way 
forward but the concern must be the period of time for which these permits are granted. 
Using immigration to respond to short-term problems makes quick and efficient 
processing by NZIS imperative.  
                                                                  
21   DoL Overview Paper: Responses to Skill and Labour Shortages – Role of Immigration. paper to Minister 16 April 2004.   
WP 06/02  MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  36  
In the latter part of this decade there will be a brief increase in the available workforce as the 
‘baby blip’ cohorts of the early 1990s work their way into the working age population. 
Possible consequences include increases in emigration if members of the New  Zealand 
workforce cannot find jobs in the domestic labour market. At this time Australia, Europe and 
North America will all be competing for skilled labour.  Irregular patterns of growth will cause 
differential pressures on the labour market and services (Bedford, Ho and Lidgard 2000). 
Immigration policy can be seen by governments as an attractive mechanism to alleviate 
various labour market challenges, but these responses can in turn be destabilising.  
7.3.4 Technology  Spillovers 
A possible approach is to pursue further the gains to native firm productivity that can be 
had from technology spillovers. In addition to the literature identified in the productivity 
section above, there is anecdotal evidence from firms involved in the Auckland Chamber 
of Commerce Skilled Migrant Employment scheme that firms are receiving great benefits 
from employing migrant workers. The scheme is funded by NZIS and administered by the 
Auckland Chamber of Commerce and aims to link skilled migrants with employers (or 
assist skilled migrants into jobs). 
There are limited policy levers available to the Government to encourage these spillovers. 
The greatest advantage may be in ensuring that action is taken to reduce barriers to 
employment, including educating the host community employers of the benefits of bringing 
migrant workers, with their varied experiences, into the workplace. There are possible 
benefits from encouraging foreign firms to locate in New  Zealand as their skills and 
knowledge are likely to spill over to native firms and workers. 
7.3.5  Investment - Business migration 
The Investor category is designed to select a sub-group of migrants whose investment 
capital and skills can create an economic return for New Zealand. There is limited robust 
evidence on the impact that business migrant flows under these business categories has 
had in New Zealand. For example the BERL study (Nana et al 2003) does not make any 
estimate of the contribution of migrants to corporate tax revenues. One of the primary 
sources of information regarding the investor category has been the New  Zealand 
Immigration Service (NZIS) evaluation of their business immigration policy (New Zealand 
Immigration Service 2002). The weight that can be placed on this is limited due to the low 
response rate from business migrants.  
The limited evidence available indicates that the majority of business migrants utilise their 
money in passive investments. A small proportion have active investments such as 
property investment (residential and commercial), owning small and medium businesses 
and shares and stocks.
22
  
In July 2005 the Government closed the Investor category and opened a new variation of 
the scheme.  The new scheme, as under the last one does not encourage active 
investment by the migrant. Investor migrants may continue to choose passive investments 
under the new scheme because they are required to retain funds of at least the same 
value as originally invested. It is, therefore, not in their interest to risk their residence 
                                                                  
22   The evaluation found that over half of those Business Investors interviewed owned or partly owned a business in New Zealand 
and a further third planned to establish or buy into a business. Advice from the New Zealand Immigration Service Business Migrant 
Unit is that this may have been unrepresentative. Their operational information suggests the majority of business migrants use 
passive investment only.  
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status by making a moderate to high-risk investment that could lose value over this period 
(especially in the situation where the funds are borrowed).  
One consideration is that a migrant’s underlying reason for migrating under this category 
may not be for investment opportunities. Evidence indicates that the Investor category 
tends to be chosen by migrants for lifestyle reasons, rather than because of perceived 
business or investment opportunities.  Even if migrants are genuine investors, passive 
investment options are often initially preferred because it gives migrants time to settle in 
New Zealand and risky investments tend to rely heavily on networks and local knowledge 
that migrants are unlikely to have, or be able to acquire quickly.  Business experience is 
now a mandatory requirement of the category.  
Even under the new investor category there is scope for removing operational 
disincentives for active investment, while addressing information asymmetry issues. The 
current policy could be amended so that migrants will still qualify for residency if they 
invest actively after the point where they can withdraw their money but their investment 
loses value in that period. More information could be provided to Investor migrants on 
New Zealand’s commercial and business environment in order to reduce the problems 
caused by information asymmetry. Longer investment periods and/or larger amounts 
could assist with signalling strength of preferences. 
The requirement in the new category that funds go to investment areas mandated by the 
government is likely to increase the return to New Zealand in the short run. After the initial 
period migrants may search for greatest market returns, which may or may not benefit 
New Zealand. In the long run returns may only be retained if the individuals continue to 
make a contribution through businesses set up in New Zealand and exploitation of global 
linkages. Requiring active investment may increase the return to New Zealand as it forces 
migrants to exploit their own business skills, it encourages use of international linkages 
thereby increasing global connectedness and injecting their funds directly into the 
economy may accelerate economic growth (for example by creating jobs). 
7.3.6 Export  Education 
Export education is now a billion dollar industry in New Zealand. The fiscal returns from 
that industry are not strictly within the bounds of an analysis of overall migration, but it is 
worth considering the policy implications, as this is a potential source of highly skilled, 
semi-settled migrants. An explicit link was made in 2004 by the government, to sell 
permanent residence to migrants who are in New Zealand on temporary permits. Students 
are seen as a ready-made source of possible resident migrants because they have 
already undergone a large part of the settlement process. Of the people issued with a 
student permit in 1997/1998, 20 percent of students have subsequently taken up 
residence. Similar trends were evident for subsequent cohorts.  The take-up of residence 
by those previously approved for a student permit tended to increase at a steady rate for 
the first two or three years after a student permit was issued, and then tailed-off 
(New Zealand Immigration Service 2004). 
The targeting of international students would seem to be a policy worth pursuing. Even 
those with a New  Zealand education who return to their country of origin are not 
necessarily a negative investment as there are gains to New Zealand from having them 
return to their country of origin such as increasing global connectedness. The OECD 
(2003b) noted that the ability of the domestic education sector to attract large numbers of 
foreign students was a promising development for improved global connectedness. In 
addition to being a flourishing export sector, it attracts people who subsequently, if they  
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decide to stay, will have few difficulties in integrating in the labour market. The OECD 
suggests that strengthening the ability of universities to build on this base to create 
successful graduate programmes that can attract foreign researchers should be a further 
objective (OECD 2003b). 
From a settlement point of view, and a human capital point of view it is worth pursuing 
these students to encourage them to become skilled residents. In addition, the work done 
by Bryant, Genc and Law (2004) in establishing links between having foreign-born people 
in a population and trade flows to their country of origin suggests that targeting students in 
particular markets where New  Zealand is looking to deepen trade links would be a 
sensible extension of this policy. 
7.4  Increasing the size of the Immigration Programme 
If bringing in skilled migrants can contribute to economic growth through participation, 
population and productivity levers then perhaps consideration should be given to 
significantly increasing the size of the Immigration Programme. The New  Zealand 
Immigration Service has advocated a cautious and measured approach to setting the level 
of residence approvals. Currently residence approvals are sitting around 50,000, but is 
there any particular reason for choosing that figure? In the past two years in New Zealand 
the policy debate on the number of migrants coming into New Zealand has focused more 
on the changing face of New  Zealand society and associated concerns around social 
cohesion rather than any economic benefits that may be conferred to the host community. 
A related question is whether an increase in the size of the migration programme 
necessarily needs to be an increase in the skilled migrant category or whether reducing 
the entry qualifications to allow in lower skilled workers would also provide greater 
economic benefits. It is suggested that despite the potential economic benefits that may 
be reaped from an increase in migration there are valid reasons for not doing this. One of 
the reasons postulated by the Immigration Service is stability in the NZIP.  Stability in 
desired approval levels sends positive signals to potential migrants, New  Zealand 
industries and employers about government’s commitment to an active NZIP in the 
medium and long term.  Stability enhances confidence in immigration, thus assisting in 
marketing New  Zealand as a destination.  Stability assists the NZIS to maintain the 
capacity to deliver immigration outcomes.  There would be logistical difficulties and costs 
associated with increasing or reducing the NZIS’s operational capacity to deal with large 
increases or reductions in the level of approvals on an annual basis.  Stability also assists 
other central, local government and other organisations to plan and maintain their capacity 
to carry out their functions (ranging from housing infrastructure to transport, day care 
services, education, health to evaluation of qualifications).  This in turn assists in the 
delivery of immigration and settlement outcomes. 
There are two aspects to the desire for stability that should be teased out. There is a 
difference between stability in total numbers of the Immigration Programme versus 
stability in policy and entry requirements. Stability for the sake of stability is not a strong 
reason for not increasing the size of the programme, as all that would need to be done 
would be to increase the size of the programme over a five year period which would 
provide sufficient notice to local and central government for their planning services. 
Infrastructure is usually viewed over a longer time horizon, so if necessary the Programme 
could be stepped up over a ten-year period. It is suggested that the related settlement 
arguments provide a more serious constraint on restricting immigration. This is not for 
pure economic reasons, but is related to a concern of possible social fragmentation.  
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In October 2003 the New  Zealand Government developed a national immigration 
settlement strategy which sets out a programme of action for settlement outcomes that 
promote social cohesion. Social cohesion was included as part of this review in an effort 
to focus on the social effects of migration on the host community in addition to the 
economic effects. 
Social cohesion is broader than migrant and refugee settlement. It involves a climate of 
collaboration so that all groups have a sense of belonging, participation, inclusion, 
recognition and legitimacy. The current government has identified a need for a greater 
understanding and monitoring of the stage of social cohesion. 
The National Immigration Settlement Strategy proposed six goals for migrants and 
refugees and their families. The goals are that migrants and refugees and their families 
should be able to: 
•  obtain employment appropriate to their qualifications and skills;  
•  are able to access appropriate information and responsive services that are available 
to the wider community; 
•  are confident using English in a New  Zealand setting or can access appropriate 
language support to bridge the gap;  
•  form supportive social networks and establish a sustainable community identity; 
•  feel safe expressing their ethnic identity and are accepted by, and are part of, the 
wider host community; and 
•  participate in civic, community and social activities. 
The priority goals for additional financial investment via the 2004 Budget were the first 
three goals listed above. 
Any decisions on whether to increase the size of the Immigration Programme need to take 
into account the absorptive capacity of the host society, both in terms of pressure on 
infrastructure and services as well as impacts on social cohesion.  As stated by Chapple 
(Chapple and Yeabsley 1996), one simple answer to why migration is limited is that there is 
a binding constraint of some form of social acceptability. The crux of the problem may be 
that migrants bring change which is highly visible, and by limiting migrant inflows the native 
population’s tolerance for change is not overstretched (Chapple and Yeabsley 1996). 
Quantum of the Programme is also important as the literature indicates that migration 
adds more to aggregate demand than to aggregate supply (Chapple and Yeabsley 1996). 
As a result it is likely that migration has some inflationary pressure. The increase in 
demand for housing caused in part by migration to Auckland has had an impact on 
housing prices. Increased inflationary pressures can add to the likelihood that the central 
bank will act to control inflation by increasing interest rates. Net migration over 2001-2002 
proved stronger and more sustained than anticipated by the New Zealand Reserve Bank. 
In the December 2003 Monetary Policy Statement the Governor stated that exchange rate 
appreciation combined with weakening migration flows was beginning to reduce pressure 
on the economy’s resources which in turn was beginning to reduce domestic inflation 
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2003).  
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8 Conclusion 
The original motivation for this paper was a desire to understand how migration impacts 
on per capita growth in New  Zealand. It is clear from the discussion that the existing 
literature is deficient in explaining this relationship. The growth accounting framework is 
not a complete theory of economic growth but it has provided a way to explore the 
pathways through which migration can impact on growth.  
The evidence has shown that migration has significant impacts on labour productivity and 
labour utilisation but significant questions remain unanswered: what is the magnitude of 
this impact? What is the true nature of the causality? What are the interlinkages between 
the skill level of migrants, or the quantum of migration and growth? An accurate 
assessment of the magnitude of the impact of immigration on economic growth is likely to 
be unattainable given existing data. A variety of theoretical economic models can be 
employed but the results are a function of the assumptions that are made at the 
beginning, which are themselves subject to question.  It is difficult to ascertain the extent 
to which theoretical models of immigration and growth accurately predict reality because 
the real world picture is confounded by other influences and by continuing policy 
adjustments which affect the composition of migrant flows. 
It is clear that further work remains to be done on the question of migration and economic 
growth. The area would benefit from strong empirical work that aims to provide policy 
advice to government on realistic and achievable policy adjustments to improve the 
returns to growth, while still balancing social policy aims. This paper has captured a 
discussion of the literature in the area and set out a way of thinking about the questions. 
More detailed qualitative, but particularly quantitative work remains to be done if those 
questions are to be adequately answered and to ensure that the debate always takes into 
account migration patterns. 
Overall, it is equivocal whether there is enough robust evidence to support the claim that 
immigration is always positive for per capita growth. This paper concurs with the 
observations of the OECD, which stated “there is not sufficient or detailed enough data on 
the behaviour of the New Zealand economy to give clear answers on the overall effects on 
per capita incomes of existing residents”. While the evidence suggests small positive net 
gains from migration, these do not necessarily stack up as an improvement in per capita 
growth rates. Whether immigration is positive is also dependent on which particular group of 
people governments are concerned about increasing the welfare of. If it is overall national 
welfare then the evidence does suggest immigration is positive. But if this is achieved 
through a lowering of the wages of native workers, albeit while potentially increasing returns 
to the owners of capital, this distribution of benefit may not be seen as desirable.   
As this paper reflects, it may be more helpful to think about migration as an opportunity to 
increase GDP per capita growth, rather than as a threat that needs to be managed. It has 
been shown that improving participation and employment rates is likely to have a positive 
effect on overall GDP per capita and this paper has looked at some indicators that 
migrants may be making a positive contribution to labour productivity.  Questions do 
remain, such as the expected increase in growth vis-a -vis the government investment 
required to increase participation and employment rates, or the extent to which the 
benefits would accrue to natives or to which subset of natives; but the available evidence 
indicates where policy efforts should be focussed.  Ensuring that the settings of the 
migration system support the improvement of migrant participation and productivity, while 
balancing social cohesion concerns, is the first step towards improving the contribution of 
migration towards economic growth per capita. Continuing to analyse, evaluate and refine 
the system must be the second.  
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